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Imagine this scenario: a woman applies for a job at a car deal-
ership. The interviewer tells her that the job is hers if she will have
oral sex with him. She refuses and he denies her the job. Last year,
in response to such an occurrence in Georgia, Representative Jim
Martin introduced a bill before the Georgia Legislature which,
among other things, would have created a new felony: "A person
commits the offense of solicitation of sex when such person... solic-
its a subordinate employee or job applicant to perform or submit to
sexual intercourse or to an act involving the sex organs of one per-
son and the mouth or anus of another as a condition of employ-
ment."' In a civil law context, courts have for over a decade2 called
this proposed crime quid pro quo sexual harassment.
Courts distinguish two types of sexual harassment: quid pro
quo and hostile environment. 3 In the workplace, quid pro quo sex-
ual harassment occurs when submission to sexual conduct is made
a term or condition of an individual's employment or when an indi-
vidual's submission to or rejection of such conduct is used as the
basis for employment decisions affecting that individual.4 Hostile
environment sexual harassment is conduct that "has the purpose or
effect of unreasonably interfering with an individual's work per-
* Judicial Clerk, Judge Marvin H. Shoob, United States District Court for the
Northern District of Georgia, Atlanta, Georgia. B.A., Yale University, 1987; J.D.,
MA., Emory University, 1994. For their comments on earlier drafts, the author
would like to thank Deborah Young, Jennifer Brown, Mary Radford, Marc Miller,
Margaret Chriss, Harvey Hill, and Ann Beeson.
1. Telephone interview with Jim Martin, Rep., (D. Atlanta) General Assembly
of Georgia (May 24, 1994). H.B. 666, 1993 General Assembly of Georgia. The bill
provided that the offense of solicitation of sex would be punishable by a fine of be-
tween $1,000 and $5,000 and/or incarceration for one to five years. Id.; See generally
Ellen Whitford, Sex Crimes Bill Redefining Rape Is in for a Fight, ATLANTA CONST.,
Feb. 11, 1993, at F1 & F6. This bill did not pass.
2. Lipsett v. University of Puerto Rico, 864 F.2d 881, 897 (1st Cir. 1988).
3. The Supreme Court first recognized this distinction in Meritor Savings Bank
v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57 (1986). See infra part I.A.
4. Lipsett, 864 F.2d at 897; see also ARTwmR LARSON & LEx K LARSON, 1 EM-
PLOyMENT DiSCRMINATION § 41A.42 (1993).
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formance or creating an intimidating, hostile, or offensive working
environment."5 Civil laws prohibit sexual harassment not only in
the workplace, but also in education, housing, and other areas.6
Recently, three states have explicitly criminalized sexual harass-
ment,7 and the military has used criminal sanctions against sexual
harassment.8 However, little discussion or exploration of the
criminalization of sexual harassment exists. 9
This Article argues that quid pro quo sexual harassment
should be treated as a crime.10 Part I begins by showing that sex-
ual harassment is a pervasive problem occurring in many contexts
such as employment, education, and housing. This Part then exam-
ines the evolution and current status of federal and state civil laws
against sexual harassment. Federal sexual harassment laws only
cover employers of a certain size and educational institutions re-
ceiving federal funds. State civil sexual harassment laws, on the
other hand, cover a wider range of situations, such as sexual har-
assment in the doctor-patient and lessor-lessee relationships. An
overview of these laws reveals their frequency and the manner in
which sexual harassment is regulated by civil law. This Part pro-
vides a background against which to evaluate the usefulness of
criminal sanctions against sexual harassment.
5. Meritor Savings Bank, 477 U.S. at 65 (citing 29 C.F.R. § 1604.11(a)(3)
(1985)).
6. See discussion infra part I.A. & I.B.
7. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 11, § 763 (Supp. 1992); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 14-395.1
(1993); TEXAS PENAL CODE ANN. § 39.02 (Supp. 1994); see infra part IV.
8. See Eric D. Placke, Criminal Liability Under the UCMJ for Sexual Harass-
ment, 19 REPORTER, Sept. 1992, at 1 (arguing that military prosecutors could prose-
cute, and in some cases have prosecuted, sexual harassers under existing laws
prohibiting disrespect, assault, provoking speech or gestures, rape, sodomy, extor-
tion, adultery, bribery, indecent acts, indecent assault, indecent exposure, and inde-
cent language); see also Peter Cary & Bruce B. Auster, What's Wrong with the Navy,
U.S. NEWS & WORLD REPORT, July 13, 1992, at 22 (reporting that "Acting Navy Sec-
retary Dan Howard proposed amending military law to make sexual harassment a
specific crime").
9. Robert T. Sigler & Ida M. Johnson, Public Perceptions of the Need for
Criminalization of Sexual Harassment, J. Cine. JusT. 229 (1986) (reporting on a
survey of 200 residents of Tuscaloosa, Alabama). Over 59% of the survey respon-
dents believed that sexual harassment resulting in sexual intercourse should be fel-
ony. Id. at 235. Over 31% believed that sexual harassment without sexual
intercourse should be a misdemeanor. Id.
10. See infra part III for a discussion of quid pro quo sexual harassment. An
investigation into criminalizing hostile environment harassment is beyond the scope
of this paper. Whereas quid pro quo sexual harassment often does not fit within
existing general crimes, hostile environment harassment often does fall within ex-
isting crimes such as battery, assault, harassment, or indecent exposure. Therefore,




Part II argues that quid pro quo sexual harassment should be
considered a crime. This Part first examines the difference between
civil and criminal wrongs, and explores why certain conduct is
criminal and other conduct is not. An argument is then made that
quid pro quo sexual harassment should be treated as a crime be-
cause sexual harassment harms not only individuals who are
harassed, but also women as a group and society as a whole. Crimi-
nal laws against quid pro quo sexual harassment could complement
the civil laws discussed in Part I to combat this kind of harassment.
Part II concludes by discussing several drawbacks to criminalizing
quid pro quo sexual harassment.
Part III discusses the possibility of prosecuting quid pro quo
sexual harassment under traditional criminal laws. Many states
have criminal laws that arguably prohibit some types of quid pro
quo sexual harassment, such as laws against criminal coercion, ex-
tortion, and receiving commercial bribes. However, most states do
not have general criminal laws that sufficiently prohibit all forms of
quid pro quo sexual harassment. This Part concludes that if states
want to criminally prohibit quid pro quo sexual harassment, they
should adopt a specific criminal law that does so.
Part IV provides an example of a criminal statute prohibiting
quid pro quo sexual harassment. This Part first describes three re-
cently-adopted criminal laws that explicitly prohibit sexual harass-
ment. A definition is then proposed for the crime of quid pro quo
sexual harassment, based in part upon these three laws. The Arti-
cle concludes by providing an historical context for the criminaliza-
tion of quid pro quo sexual harassment.
I. The Civil Law Response to the Problem of Sexual
Harassment
Sexual harassment is a pervasive, grave, and deeply rooted
problem in American society. Numerous studies have documented
the existence of sexual harassment in employment,
1 education,12
and housing. 13 An early study on sexual harassment in the federal
workplace revealed that forty-two percent of the approximately
10,648 women responding reported that they had been sexually
harassed in the two years prior to the survey. 14 A follow-up study
several years later revealed a similarly high rate of sexual harass-
11. See infra notes 14-18 and accompanying text.
12. See infra notes 19-22 and accompanying text.
13. See infra notes 23-24 and accompanying text.
14. U.S. MERIT Sys. PROTEcTION BD., SEXUAL HARASSMENT IN THE FEDERAL
WORKPLACE: IS IT A PROBLEM? 33-35, A-4 (1981).
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ment.' 5 Sexual harassment of women in the private sector is also
extensive.16 Women occupying traditionally male jobs experience
even higher rates of harassment.17 Furthermore, the number of
sexual harassment complaints appears to be increasing. The Equal
Employment Opportunity Commission, the agency responsible for
enforcing federal laws against sexual harassment in the workplace,
has reported a tremendous increase in sexual harassment com-
plaints in the last several years - from 5,694 sexual harassment
complaints in 1990, to 6,675 in 1991, to 10,532 in 1992.18
Sexual harassment affects not only the workplace, but also
other settings such as education and housing. Large numbers of
college students report sexual harassment by professors 19 and by
peers.20 An estimated thirty percent of female undergraduates ex-
perience some form of sexual harassment from at least one of their
professors during their education.21 Younger students are also
targets of sexual harassment. Two recent studies involving pri-
mary and secondary students reveal high rates of sexual harass-
15. U.S. MERIT Sys. PROTECTION BD., SEXUAL HARASSMENT IN THE FEDERAL Gov-
ERNwENT: AN UPDATE 2, 11-21 (1988).
16. 1 LARSON & LARSON, supra note 4, § 41A.12, at 80-152; see also Louise F.
Fitzgerald & Alayne J. Ormerod, Breaking Silence: The Sexual Harassment of Wo-
men in Academia and the Workplace, in PSYCHOLOGY OF WOMEN: A HANDBOOK OF
ISSUES AND THEORIES 553, 559 (Florence L. Denmark & Michelle A. Paludi eds.,
1993) (estimating that 50% of women will experience sexual harassment at some
time during their academic or working lives). A survey of large corporations re-
vealed that ninety percent have received complaints of sexual harassment, and a
third have been sued. Ronni Sandroff, Sexual Harassment in the Fortune 500,
WORKING WoMAN, Dec. 1988, at 69 (reporting on 160 of the Fortune 500 companies
that had responded to a survey).
17. Edward Lafontaine & Leslie Tredeau, The Frequency, Sources, and Corre-
lates of Sexual Harassment Among Women in Traditional Male Occupations, 15 SEX
ROLES 433, 436 (1986) (reporting survey findings that women in traditionally male
occupations experience sexual harassment more frequently than women generally).
18. 1 LARSON & LARSON, supra note 4, § 41A.12 n.12; Ann Lopez, Clippings, MS.,
July-Aug. 1993, at 87. Some have speculated that this increase is at least in part
due to the highly publicized sexual harassment scandals involving the 1991
Supreme Court nominee Clarence Thomas and the 1991 Tailhook naval aviators
convention. See 1 LARSON & LARSON, supra note 4, § 41A.12, at 8-153.
19. Linda J. Rubin & Sherry B. Borgers, Sexual Harassment in Universities Dur-
ing the 1980s, 23 SEX RoLEs 397 (1990); see generally BiLLE WRmGHT DZIECH &
LINDA WEINER, THE LECHEROUS PROFESSOR (2d ed. 1990) (discussing sexual harass-
ment of students by college professors).
20. JEAN O'GomAN HUGHES & BERNICE R. SANDLER, PEER HARASSMENT:
HASSLES FOR WOMEN ON CAMPus (1988).
21. Rubin & Borgers, supra note 19, at 402; see also MICHELE A. PALUDI & RICH-
ARD B. BARICKMAN, ACADEMIC AND WORKPLACE HARASSMENT: A RESOURCE MANUAL 1-
26 (1991) (citing numerous studies showing the high incidence of sexual harassment
in schools as well as the workplace); IVORY POWER: SEXUAL HARASSMENT ON CAMPUS




ment in schools.22 Sexual harassment also plagues women seeking
housing.23 A 1987 survey revealed that many women across the
country have reported sexual harassment in housing to fair housing
centers. 24 These studies all point to the fact that sexual harass-
ment is a severe and widespread problem in American society.
Legislators have addressed the problem of sexual harassment
extensively through civil laws. Sexual harassment first emerged as
a civil rights cause of action focused primarily on the discriminatory
effects of sexual harassment in the workplace.25 However, over
time, sexual harassment law has reached into housing, education,
professional licensing, and other areas.26
A. Federal Sexual Harassment Law
Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964,27 prohibiting discrim-
ination in employment, and Title IX of the Education Amendments
of 1972,28 prohibiting discrimination in education, are the primary
sources for federal sexual harassment law. Redress for sexual har-
assment also has been sought, less frequently, under section 1983
of Title 42,29 the Federal Employees Liability Act,30 and the Equal
22. EDUC. FOUND. OF THE AM. Ass'N OF UNiv. WOMEN, HOSTIE HALLWAYS: THE
AAUW SURVEY OF SEXUAL HARASSMENT IN AMEmRCA'S SCHOOLS (1993) (reporting
high rates of sexual harassment in a survey of 1632 students in grades 8 to 11); NAN
STEIN ET AL., SECRETS IN PUBLIC: SEXUAL HARASSMENT IN OUR SCHOOLS (1993) (re-
porting high rates of sexual harassment in a survey of over 4,000 school girls be-
tween the ages of 9 and 19).
23. WnULm Lrrr ET AL., Recent Developments: Sexual Harassment Hits Home, 2
UCLA WOMEN'S L.J. 227 (1992) (suggesting legal strategies for addressing rental
housing sexual harassment); Kathleen Butler, Note, Sexual Harassment in Rental
Housing, 1989 U. ILL L. REV. 175 (discussing the problem of sexual harassment of
women in the rental housing market).
24. Regina Cahan, Comment, Home Is No Haven: An Analysis of Sexual Harass.
ment in Housing, 1987 Wisc. L. REV. 1061, 1065-75. The survey was sent to 150
public and private fair housing centers, agencies, and organizations across the coun-
try. Of the 87 centers that responded, 57 reported receiving sexual harassment in
housing complaints. Id. at 1066. Overall, 288 incidents of sexual harassment were
reported to the centers. Id. Respondents reported instances of women who were
evicted because they refused to cooperate with the landlords' sexual demands. Id. at
1067 n.20. One woman reported that a rental manager served her notice of eviction
because she refused to have sex with him. Id. at 1065. Another woman reported
that her apartment owner demanded that she have sex with him in addition to pay-
ing rent in order for her to remain on the premises. Id. at 1064-65. An undercover
investigation of Chicago homeless shelters found that employees were requiring sex-
ual conduct in exchange for admission to the limited spaces in shelters. Butler,
supra note 23, at 180 n.48.
25. See infra notes 32-55 and accompanying text.
26. See infra notes 56-97 and accompanying text.
27. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e (1988).
28. 20 U.S.C. § 1681 (1988).
29. 42 U.S.C. 1983 (1988); see 1 LARSON & LARSON, supra note 4, § 41A.91(a);
Kristin D. Sanko, Note, Employer Liability and Sexual Harassment Under 1983:
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Protection and Due Process Clauses of the Constitution.31 This sec-
tion focuses on federal sexual harassment law under Titles VII and
IX.
Title VII prohibits employers from discriminating on the basis
of sex.32 Very little legislative history exists to clarify the prohibi-
tion of sex discrimination because Title VII was primarily a race
discrimination statute to which Congress added the word "sex" on
the floor of the House of Representatives. 33 In 1980, the Equal Em-
ployment Opportunity Commission (EEOC), the administrative
agency responsible for enforcing the Civil Rights Act of 1964,34 is-
sued guidelines interpreting Title VII to prohibit both quid pro quo
and hostile environment sexual harassment.3 5 The EEOC guide-
lines define sexually harassing conduct as "unwelcome sexual ad-
vances, requests for sexual favors, and other verbal or physical
conduct of a sexual nature."36 Quid pro quo sexual harassment ex-
ists when a supervisor conditions employment benefits on the ac-
quiescence to sexual advances 37 or subjects a subordinate to
detrimental employment consequences, such as termination or de-
nial of a promotion or job training, for refusing to submit to sexual
advances.38 Hostile environment harassment is sex-based conduct
that does not result in a tangible detriment, but that adversely af-
fects intangible aspects of employment such as the psychological
Starrett v. Wadley, 67 DENY. U. L. REV. 571 (1990) (discussing municipal liability
under § 1983 for sexual harassment).
30. Wilson v. Zapata Off-Shore Co., 939 F.2d 260 (5th Cir. 1991) (allowing FELA
claim for sexual harassment); Masiello v. Metro-North Commuter R.R., 748 F. Supp.
199 (S.DJN.Y. 1990) (allowing FELA claim for sexual harassment). But see Griggs v.
National R.R. Passenger Corp, 900 F.2d 74 (6th Cir. 1990) (reading FELA narrowly
to exclude Title VII-type injuries). Claims under the Racketeer Influenced and Cor-
rupt Organization Act and the Federal Tort Claims Act rarely succeed. See 1 LAR-
SON & LARSON, supra note 4, § 41A.91(c).
31. See Doe v. Taylor Independent School District, 975 F.2d 137 (5th Cir. 1992)
(holding that a student has a firmly established constitutional right under the Due
Process and Equal Protection Clauses of the Fourteenth Amendment to be free from
sexual molestation by a state-employed school teacher).
32. Title VII states in pertinent part, "It shall be an unlawful employment prac-
tice for an employer-(1) to fail or refuse to hire or to discharge any individual, or
otherwise to discriminate against any individual with respect to his [or her] compen-
sation, terms, conditions, or privileges of employment, because of such individ-
ual's.., sex .... " 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(1) (1988).
33. 110 CONG. REC. 2577-84 (1964).
34. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e (1988).
35. 29 C.F.R. § 1604.11(a) (1991).
36. Id.
37. For example, the employer may say "Ill promote you if you have sex with
me." The implicit threat in this statement is, "I won't promote you if you don't have
sex with me." See supra note 4 and accompanying text.
38. 1 LARSON & LARSON, supra note 4, § 41A.42, at 8-192.
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and emotional well-being of an employee.39 According to the EEOC
guidelines, an employer is vicariously liable for both forms of sexual
harassment when perpetrated by supervisors. 4 0 The employer,
however, is liable for harassment perpetrated by coworkers and
nonemployees only if the employer knew or should have known of
the harassment and failed to "take immediate and appropriate cor-
rective action."41 The guidelines also recommend that employers
take preventive measures to eliminate sexual harassment 4 2 and
state that employers may be liable to those denied employment op-
portunities or benefits given to another employee because of sub-
mission to sexual advances. 43 These guidelines have been very
influential in the courts.44
Courts have followed the EEOC guidelines in interpreting Ti-
tle VII to prohibit sexual harassment of employees. In 1986, the
Supreme Court first addressed sexual harassment under Title VII
in Meritor Savings Bank v. Vinson.4 5 This case involved a female
bank employee who claimed that she was constantly subjected to
sexual demands by her supervisor for four years. 46 The supervisor
did not threaten to fire or demote her, but she felt compelled to com-
ply with his demands. She finally was discharged from the job for
excessive use of sick leave. 4 7 The Court held that Title VII prohib-
ited sexual harassment. 48 The Court accepted the distinction be-
tween quid pro quo and hostile environment harassment, and held
that a hostile environment harassment plaintiff must prove that
the harassment was "sufficiently severe or pervasive to alter the
conditions of employment."49 In other words, the harassment must
have some specific negative effect on the plaintiff's employment.
The Court also ruled that even an employee's "voluntary"50 submis-
sion to an employers sexual advances does not necessarily defeat a
harassment claim if the advances were unwelcome, but that a com-
plainant's "sexually provocative speech or dress is ... obviously rel-
39. Id. § 41A.44.
40. 29 C.F.R. § 1604.11(c); see 1 LARSON & LARSON, supra note 4, § 41A.44.
41. 29 C.F.R. § 1604.11(d)-(e) (1991).
42. Id. § 1604.11(f).
43. Id. § 1604.11(g).
44. See Meritor Savings Bank v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57, 65 (1986) (defining sexual
harassment according to the EEOC guidelines).
45. 477 U.S. 57 (1986).
46. Id. at 60.
47. Id. at 60.
48. Id. at 73.
49. Id. at 67.
50. The Court defined "voluntary" to mean in these situations that the complain-
ant was not forced to participate against her will. Meritor Savings Bank v. Vinson,
477 U.S. 57, 68 (1986).
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evant"51 in determining whether advances were unwelcome.
Finally, the Court discussed but did not rule on employer liability
for hostile environment harassment by supervisors, instead recom-
mending the use of common law agency principles.52 Circuit
courts, however, have consistently held employers strictly liable for
quid pro quo sexual harassment by supervisors.53
Since Meritor Savings Bank, lower courts have devised nu-
merous tests to determine when harassing conduct is severe or per-
vasive.54 The Supreme Court recently rejected a requirement that
a plaintiff prove severe psychological harm in order to prevail in a
Title VII sexual harassment claim. In Harris v. Forklift Systems,
Inc., a company president subjected a female manager, Teresa Har-
ris, to sexual innuendo, unwanted physical touching, and insults
because of her gender.55 Harris complained to the president, but he
continued his harassing conduct.56 After two years, she left the
job.57 The District Court found that the president's conduct did not
create an abusive environment because it was not so severe as to
seriously affect Harris' psychological well-being or lead her to suffer
injury.58 The Supreme Court reversed, ruling that a plaintiff must
only show that the conduct at issue would have offended a "reason-
able person."59
Before 1991, Title VII only provided a partially compensatory
remedy: reinstatement, back pay, and any other appropriate equi-
table relief.60 Under the Civil Rights Act of 1991, Congress ex-
51. Id. at 69. See Mary F. Radford, By Invitation Only: The Proof of Welcomeness
in Sexual Harassment Cases, 72 N.C. L. REv. 499 (1994) (critiquing the court's treat-
ment of the issue of welcomeness).
52. Meritor Savings Bank, 477 U.S. at 72. The Court stated that due to Title
VIrs definition of "employer" to include "agent", "we hold that the Court of Appeals
erred in concluding that employers are always automatically liable for sexual har-
assment by their supervisors... [but that] absence of notice to an employer does not
necessarily insulate that employer from liability." Id. However, the Court held that
the mere existence of a grievance procedure and a policy against discrimination does
not insulate an employer from liability. Id. at 73-4. See generally RESTATEMENT
(SECoND) OF AGENCY §§ 219-237 (1958). Circuit courts are divided as to whether an
employer is liable for hostile environment harassment by a supervisor. See 1 LAR-
SON & LARSON, supra note 4, § 41A.65(a).
53. 1 LARSON & LARSON, supra note 4, § 41A-63.
54. Compare Rabidue v. Osceola Ref. Co., 805 F.2d 611 (6th Cir. 1986), cert. de-
nied, 481 U.S. 1041 (1987) (adopting a reasonable person standard), with Ellison v.
Brady, 924 F.2d 872 (9th Cir. 1991) (adopting a reasonable woman standard).
55. Harris v. Forklift Systems, Inc., 61 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 240 (M.D.
Tenn. 1991), aff'dper curiam, 976 F.2d 733 (6th Cir. 1992), rev'd and remanded, 114
S. Ct. 367, 369 (1993).
56. Harris v. Forklift Systems, Inc., 114 S. Ct. 367, 369 (1993).
57. Id.
58. Id.
59. Id. at 370.
60. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(g) (1988).
220 [Vol. 13:213
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panded the remedies for intentional discrimination under Title VII
to include compensatory damages and punitive damages of up to
$300,000, based on the size of the employer.61 This change resulted
from a recognition of the seriousness of discrimination and the in-
adequacy of the prior remedial structure.62§
Federal sexual harassment law also has developed under Title
IX, which prohibits discrimination on the basis of sex in any feder-
ally assisted educational program,63 with certain limited excep-
tions.64 The United States Department of Education Office for Civil
Rights enforces Title IX by monitoring federally funded educational
institutions and withholding federal funds from institutions that
discriminate on the basis of sex. In 1979, the Supreme Court held
that Title IX was also enforceable by an individual through a pri-
vate action.65 However, in subsequent decisions the Supreme
Court interpreted several procedural barriers into Title IX, which
hampered its effectiveness. 66 As a result, sexual harassment law
was slower to develop under Title IX than under Title VII.
In the late 1980s, however, Congress responded to these
Supreme Court decisions by enacting legislation that strengthened
Title IX.67 Title IX was also strengthened by a recent Supreme
Court decision, Franklin v. Gwinnett County Public Schools,68
61. 42 U.S.C. § 1981a cmt. (1991). The Civil Rights Act of 1991 also provided for
jury trials.
62. ARTHm LAtSON & Lax K. LARSON, 2 Eima rnyfr DISCRmnMNATION § 55.41,
14-15 (1994).
63. 20 U.S.C. § 1681(a) (1988). "No person in the United States shall, on the
basis of sex, be excluded from participation in, be denied the benefits of, or be sub-
jected to discrimination under any education program or activity receiving Federal
financial assistance." Id.
64. 20 U.S.C. § 1681(a) (1988) (exempting educational institutions controlled by
religious organizations, military and merchant marine educational institutions,
membership practices of certain organizations, boy or girl conferences, and father-
son or mother-daughter activities at educational institutions from Title IX
prohibitions).
65. Cannon v. University of Chi., 441 U.S. 677 (1979).
66. See North Haven Bd. ofEduc. v. Bell, 456 U.S. 512 (1982) (holding that Title
IX only applied to specific programs receiving federal aid, and therefore an educa-
tional institution was not required to conform all of its programs or the entire insti-
tution to Title IX merely because one or a few programs received federal assistance);
Grove City College v. Bell, 465 U.S. 555 (1984) (narrowly defining a 'program'); Atas-
cadero State Hospital v. Scanlon, 473 U.S. 234 (1985) (holding that mere acceptance
of federal funds does not waive a state's sovereign immunity under the Eleventh
Amendment).
67. See Civil Rights Restoration Act of 1987, 20 U.S.C. § 1687(2XA) (1988) (ex-
panding the jurisdiction of Title IX to cover an entire institution if any part receives
federal money); Civil Rights Remedies Equalization Amendment of 1986,-42 U.S.C.
§ 2000d-7 (1988) (expressly abrogating the states' Eleventh Amendment immunity
from suit under Title IX, thereby allowing plaintiffs to file suit against states and
state institutions).
68. 112 S. Ct. 1028 (1992).
1994]
Law and Inequality
which established a damage remedy for Title IX plaintiffs.69 The
Court held that a plaintiff can receive compensatory and punitive
damages for an intentional violation of Title IX.70 As a result of
Franklin, Title IX has become an attractive tool to gain monetary
compensation for harm resulting from sexual harassment in
schools.
Due to Title IX's historical limitations, little case law exists on
sexual harassment in educational institutions, especially with re-
gard to students. The Office for Civil Rights has not issued specific
guidelines on sexual harassment,7' but informally maintains that
sexual harassment is prohibited by Title I72 Generally, courts
have found both quid pro quo7 3 and hostile environment harass-
ment 74 actionable under Title IX. Franklin v. Gwinnett County
Public Schools, 75 the first Title IX sexual harassment case filed by a
student to reach the Supreme Court, involved a hostile environ-
ment sexual harassment complaint by a high school student who
69. Because students have historically been transient members of the educa-
tional community, they had little to gain personally through Title IX, especially con-
sidering the stigmatization and reprisals from peers likely to result from bringing
such charges. Also, cases were likely to become moot before their judicial resolution
because the student had graduated. Sandra Shullman & Barbara Watts, Legal Is-
sues, in IVORY POWER, supra note 21, at 251, 258.
70. See Franklin, 112 S. Ct. at 1029 (stating the federal courts have the power to
award any relief for a federal cause of action).
71. However, OCR Guidelines prohibit a covered educational institution from
subjecting any person to separate or different behavior, sanctions, or other treat-
ment. 34 C.F.R. § 106.31(bX4) (1986); see Carrie N. Baker, Proposed Title IX Guide-
lines on Sex-Based Harassment of Students, 43 EMORY L.J. 271 (1994) (proposing
standards under Title IX for sex-based harassment of students).
72. See United States Department of Education Office for Civil Rights, Policy
Memorandum from Antonio J. Califia, Director for Litigation, Enforcement, and Pol-
icy Service, to Regional Civil Rights Directors (Aug. 31, 1981) (discussing Title IX
and Sexual Harassment Complaints).
73. See, e.g., Bougher v. University of Pittsburgh, 713 F. Supp. 139 (W.D. Pa.
1989), aff'd, 882 F.2d 74 (3d Cir. 1989) (holding that Title IX clearly reaches quid pro
quo sexual harassment by conditioning benefits on the basis of impermissible crite-
ria); Alexander v. Yale Univ., 459 F. Supp. 1 (D. Conn. 1977), aff'd, 631 F.2d 178 (2d
Cir. 1980) (finding that quid pro quo sexual harassment was a valid claim under
Title IX).
74. See, e.g., Franklin v. Gwinnett County Pub. Sch., 112 S. Ct. 1028 (1992);
Hastings v. Hancock, 842 F. Supp. 1315 (D. Kan. 1993) (applying agency principles
to hold a school liable for hostile environment sexual harassment by a school direc-
tor); Doe v. Petaluma City School District, 830 F. Supp. 1560 (N.D. Cal. 1993) (hold-
ing that a student may bring a hostile environment sexual harassment claim under
Title IX); Patricia H. v. Berkeley Unified School District, 830 F. Supp. 1288 (N.D.
Cal. 1993) (holding that Title IX prohibits the maintenance of a sexually hostile edu-
cational environment in any educational program or activity receiving federal finan-
cial assistance); Moire v. Temple University School of Medicine, 613 F. Supp. 1360
(E.D. Pa. 1985) (finding that Title IX prohibited hostile environment sexual harass-
ment and suggesting that the EEOC guidelines on sexual harassment under Title
VII may apply to Title IX), aff'd, 800 F.2d 1136 (3d Cir. 1986).
75. 112 S. Ct. 1028 (1992).
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was persistently subjected to the sexual advances of a teacher at
school.76 Franklin was primarily about whether Title IX provides a
damage remedy, but the Court also recognized that hostile environ-
ment sexual harassment was actionable under Title IX.77 The
Court stated, "unquestionably, Title IX placed on the [defendant]
the duty not to discriminate on the basis of sex, and 'when a super-
visor sexually harasses a subordinate because of the subordinate's
sex, that supervisor 'discriminate[s]' on the basis of sex.' "78
In sum, federal courts have accepted that quid pro quo and
hostile environment sexual harassment directed at students is for-
bidden by Title IX as is sexual harassment of employees under Title
VII. Both of these civil actions provide compensatory and punitive
damages for sexual harassment. State laws provide civil law reme-
dies against sexual harassment in many additional areas.79
B. State Sexual Harassment Law
Most states have civil laws prohibiting sexual harassment.
Many have laws similar to Title VII which broadly prohibit sex dis-
crimination in employment, including sexual harassment.8 0 How-
ever, state sexual harassment laws go beyond federal laws in that
they also regulate behavior outside of the workplace and the educa-
tional environment. State regulation of sexual harassment covers
six general areas: 1) employment; 2) housing; 3) education; 4) li-
censed professionals; 5) public accommodations, services, and bene-
fits; and 6) tort causes of action for sexual harassment. This section
briefly describes these general categories of law.
Most states have fair employment practice laws forbidding
public employers8 ' and often private employers8 2 from discriminat-
ing on the basis of sex,83 which often includes sexual harassment.
8 4
Most of these laws provide protection identical to Title VII.85 How-
ever, state laws often offer longer statutes of limitations, more gen-
erous damage provisions, and a broader definition of an employer
76. Id. at 1031.
77. Id. at 1037.
78. Id.
79. See supra note 70.
80. See supra part I.A.
81. See, e.g., GA. CODE ANN. §§ 45-19-20 et seq. (1992); IND. CODE ANN. § 2.11
(Burns 1991); IowA CODE ANN. § 2.42 (West 1992).
82. See, e.g., 43 PA. CONST. STAT. ANN. §§ 951 et seq. (1992).
83. Only Alabama and Arkansas do not have fair employment practice laws.
84. 1 LARsON & LARSON, supra note 4, § 41A.92.
85. Id.; see, e.g., Fisher v. San Pedro Peninsula Hosp., 214 Cal. App. 3d. 590
(1989), rev. denied; Howard Univ. v. Best, 484 A.2d 958 (D.C. App. 1984).
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than Title VII.86 Many states also have laws requiring sexual har-
assment training and notices in the workplace,S7 as well as a writ-
ten complaint process and penalties for sexual harassment.88
The second most common type of state law against sexual har-
assment prohibits sex discrimination and sexual harassment in
housing.8 9 Several states specifically prohibit sexual harassment of
tenants;90 others prohibit sex discrimination in housing, which in-
cludes sexual harassment.91
Sexual harassment in education is another common area of
state regulation.92 Several states prohibit sex discrimination in ed-
ucation,93 and some require educational institutions to adopt and
post written disciplinary procedures, 94 to provide sexual harass-
ment reporting procedures, 95 and to assist students who are targets
of sexual harassment.96
Eleven states mandate the revocation of some types of profes-
sional licenses if the licensee sexually harasses a client. Five states
revoke psychology licenses for sexual harassment;97 three revoke
licenses of health care professionals (including physicians); 98 and
one revokes licenses of professionals generally. 99
86. 1 LARSON & LARSON, supra note 4, § 41A.92; Lautenslager v. Supermarket
Gen., 600 A.2d 525 (N.J. Law Div. 1991); IOWA CODE § 601A.15 (1988); Mich. Comp.
Laws § 37.2201 (1985).
87. See, e.g., ME. REv. STAT. ANN. tit. 26, § 807 (West 1993).
88. See, e.g., ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 775, 1 5/2-105 (1993).
89. Seventeen states prohibit sex discrimination in housing (Alaska, Hawaii,
Idaho, Indiana, Iowa, Kansas, Maine, Maryland, Michigan, Minnesota, Missouri,
New Jersey, North Carolina, North Dakota, Pennsylvania, Tennessee, and
Wisconsin).
90. See, e.g., Wis. STAT. § 101.22 (1992).
91. See, e.g., IDAHO CODE § 67-5901 (1992); IowA CODE §§ 216.8, 216.6 (1992).
92. Twelve states have laws regarding sex discrimination and sexual harass-
ment in education (Alaska, California, Connecticut, Hawaii, Illinois, Indiana, Iowa,
Massachusetts, Michigan, Minnesota, Washington, and Wisconsin).
93. See, e.g., HAw. REv. STAT. § 296-71 (1XB) (1992); IND. CODE ANN. § 22-9-1-2
(Burns 1992).
94. MuqN. STAT. § 127.46 (1992 & Supp. 1993).
95. See, e.g., CONN. GEN. STAT. § 10a-55c (a03) (Supp. 1994); MIN. STAT.
§ 127.46 (1992 & Supp. 1993).
96. Wis. STAT. § 36.11(22)(a)(iXc) (1992).
97. ALA. CODE § 34-26-46 (1992); HAw. REv. STAT. § 465-13 (1992); LA. REV.
STAT. ANN. § 37:2359(BX2Xa) (West 1988); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 90-270.15 (1993);
OKLA. STAT. tit. 59, § 1370(A)(6) (Supp. 1994).
98. D.C. CODE ANN. § 2-3305.14 (1994) (health care professional's license re-
voked for sexual harassment); S.D. CODIFIED LAws ANN. § 36-4-29, -30 (1992) (physi-
cians may lose their professional license for unprofessional conduct including 'gross
or immoral sexual harassment'); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 26, § 541 (Supp. 1993) (sexual
harassment by a chiropractic physician is unprofessional conduct and grounds for
revocation of license or disciplinary proceedings).
99. CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE § 125.6 (Deering 1992) (revoking or denying profes-
sional license if a person discriminates based on sex).
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Several states provide protection from sexual harassment in
public accommodations,10 0 services, and benefits. For example,
Maine provides that an AFDC recipient cannot be sanctioned for
failure to participate in a required educational program if the fail-
ure is due to sexual harassment.10 1 Laws in Massachusetts and
Minnesota explicitly provide for unemployment compensation bene-
fits if employment termination was due to sexual harassment.102
Massachusetts also prohibits sexual harassment of people in the
care of the state.1 0 3 Some states more generally prohibit sexual
harassment of the elderly and disabled.104 Kansas provides that
sexual harassment is cause to dismiss public officials.105
A final important area of civil liability for sexual harassment
is tort law. Plaintiffs have won compensation for sexually harass-
ing conduct under state laws of assault and battery,106 intentional
infliction of emotional distress, 10 7 invasion of privacy,' 0 8 tortious
interference with contract, 10 9  and negligent hiring and
retention. 110
State laws against sexual harassment cover a much broader
range of conduct and relationships than federal law. The large
number of civil laws prohibiting sexual harassment indicate con-
cern on the part of state legislatures about sexual harassment. The
regulations presumably reflect areas in which states have discov-
ered problems with sexual harassment. The statistics on sexual
harassment and the extensive civil legislative response show that
sexual harassment is a serious and widespread problem. Whether
100. See, e.g., MINN. STAT. § 363.03, subd. 3(1) (1992 & Supp. 1993).
101. ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 22, § 3785 (West 1964 & Supp. 1993).
102. See MAsS. ANN. LAwS ch. 151A, § 25(e) (Law. Co-op. Supp. 1994); MINN.
STAT. § 268.09, subd. 1(a) (1992).
103. See MAsS. ANN. LAws ch. 30, § 9b (Law. Co-op. Supp. 1994).
104. GA. CODE. ANN. §§ 31-8-81 (1) & 31-8-82(3) (1991) (protecting residents in
long-term care); OR. REV. STAT. § 430-735 (Supp. 1994) (disabled adults); PA. STAT.
ANN. tit. 35, § 10211-24 (1992) (protects the elderly).
105. See, e.g., KAN. STAT. ANN. § 75-2949f (1989).
106. See, e.g., Valdez v. Church's Fried Chicken, Inc., 683 F. Supp. 596 (W.D. Tex.
1988) (holding coworker liable for civil damages); Wirig v. Kinney Shoe Corp, 461
N.W.2d 374 (Minn. 1990) (allowing plaintiff to bring a claim for battery and sexual
harassment under Minnesota's Human Rights Act).
107. See Hogan v. Forsyth Country Club, 340 S.E.2d 116 (N.C. 1986) (finding sex-
ual harassment constituted intentional infliction of emotional distress); Howard
Univ. v. Best, 484 A.2d 958 (D.C. 1984) (harassing conduct constituted a prima facie
case of intentional infliction of emotional distress). Some states also provide a pri-
vate cause of action for damages under anti-discrimination laws. See, e.g., D.C.
CODE ANN. § 1-2556 (1992).
108. Rogers v. Loews LEnfant Plaza Hotel, 526 F. Supp. 523 (D.D.C. 1981).
109. Kyziazi v. Western Elec. Co., 461 F. Supp. 894, 950 (D. N.J. 1978).
110. 1 LARSON & LARSON, supra note 4, § 41A.92, at 8-284.
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civil law is an adequate response to this problem will now be
explored.
H1. Arguments for Treating Quid Pro Quo Sexual
Harassment as a Crime
The problem of sexual harassment should be addressed
through criminal laws as well as civil laws. The first section of this
Part distinguishes civil law from criminal law. The second section
argues that quid pro quo sexual harassment should be a crime and
addresses some of the possible drawbacks to criminal sexual har-
assment laws.
A Justifying Criminalization
Ordinary negligence in driving may lead to tort liability, but
usually will not lead to criminal liability."'1 However, drunk driv-
ing may result in criminal liability as well as tort liability. Why are
these acts treated differently? Criminal law and civil law both "aim
to shape people's conduct along lines which are beneficial to soci-
ety."'112 Civil liability for careless driving and criminal liability for
drunk driving both serve the goal of reducing traffic accidents. The
remedy may even be similar in effect: the civil wrongdoer may be
required to pay the medical expenses of those hurt or may be sub-
ject to punitive damages, while the criminally liable drunk driver
may have to pay a fine.
Criminal and civil law, however, address different concerns
and function differently. For example, a drunk driver is generally
considered more dangerous to society at large, and more morally
blameworthy, than a negligent driver. The nature of the remedies
afforded by civil and criminal law differ: the civilly liable negligent
driver will only have to pay damages if someone or something is
harmed because the damages compensate the victims for harm. On
the other hand, the state imposes a fine upon the drunk driver
whether or not anyone is harmed because the purpose of a fine is to
punish the wrongdoer.113 The drunk driver, as a result of a crimi-
nal action, may also go to jail. Finally, the victim of a negligent
driver has the choice of whether to pursue civil remedies, whereas
only the state can criminally prosecute the drunk driver.
111. WAYNE R. LAFAVE & AusTIN W. SCOT, JR., CnmNAL LAW § 3.7(a) & (b) (2d
ed. 1986).
112. Id. § 1.3(a).
113. Id. § 1.3(b) (noting that 'to shoot at and miss a sleeping man cannot be a civil
assault, as there is no injury, even mental, to the sleeper; but such behavior is so-
cially dangerous enough to constitute a criminal assault').
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The interests affected, the party responsible for instituting ju-
dicial proceedings against the offender, and the remedy afforded by
law distinguish civil and criminal wrongs.114 Civil law enforces, re-
dresses, and protects private rights."15 Injured persons bring civil
actions against wrongdoers, primarily in order to gain compensa-
tion "for the damage suffered at the expense of the wrongdoer."116
Civil action may in some cases warrant punitive damages when
"aggravation or outrage, such as spite or 'malice,' " accompanied the
defendant's wrongdoing, but plaintiffs usually collect only compen-
satory damages. 117
Criminal law, on the other hand, exists to protect the public
from harm.11s A crime is "an offense done against the public at
large,"119 or an "act done in violation of those duties which an indi-
vidual owes to the community, and for the breach of which the law
has provided that the offender shall make satisfaction to the pub-
lic."12 0 William Blackstone explained,
The distinction of public wrongs from private, of crimes and
misdemeanors from civil injuries, seems principally to consist
in this: that private wrongs, or civil injuries, are an infringe-
ment or privation of the civil rights which belong to individuals,
considered merely as individuals; public wrongs, or crimes and
misdemeanors, are a breach and violation of the public rights
and duties, due to the whole community considered as a com-
munity, in its social aggregate capacity. 12 1
In criminal cases, the state, as representative of the public, brings
proceedings in the form of a criminal prosecution to protect and vin-
dicate the interests of the public as a whole. The victim in a crimi-
nal case serves only as the accuser and witness for the state, and
does not usually receive any direct compensation as a result of a
conviction. 122
The distinction, however, between private wrongs and public
wrongs is ambiguous. Professor Lawrence Friedman argued that
114. W. PAGE KEETON ET AL., PROSSER AND KEETON ON THE LAW OF TORTS § 2, at 7
(5th ed. 1984) [hereinafter PROSSER & KEETON]; LAFAVE & Scorr, supra note 111,
§ 1.3(a).
115. BLACi's LAw DICTIONARY 244 (6th ed. 1990) [hereinafter BLAci's].
116. PROSSER & KEETON, supra note 114, § 2, at 7.
117. Id. § 2 at 9-10 (footnotes omitted).
118. LAFAVE & ScoTT, supra note 111, § 1.3(b); BLAcK's, supra note 115, at 245.
But see MODEL PENAL CODE § 1.02(lXa) (1985) [hereinafter MPC] (defining the pur-
poses of its provisions as "to forbid and prevent conduct that unjustifiably and inex-
cusably inflicts or threatens substantial harm to individual or public interests").
119. PROSSER & KEETON, supra note 114, § 2, at 7.
120. BLAcK's, supra note 115, at 374.





communities make a "social and political decision" that an act is a
crime: "Behind every legal judgment of criminality is a more power-
ful, more basic social judgment, a judgment that this behavior,
whatever it is, deserves to be outlawed and punished."123 Fried-
man emphasized that many "nasty" or "evil" acts are not illegal. 124
In making decisions to criminalize certain conduct, the community
comes to a consensus that it will not tolerate this kind of behav-
ior.X25 However, this descriptive account of how conduct becomes
criminal does not reveal sufficiently the principles underlying the
decisions to criminalize behavior.
Professor Sanford Kadish described criminal law as a "highly
specialized tool of social control" and argued that "the decision to
criminalize any particular behavior must follow only after an as-
sessment and balancing of gains and losses."126 Factors such as
who is affected by the conduct at issue and how they are affected
are considered in this balancing process. Professor Joel Feinberg
distinguished several principles underlying decisions to criminalize
conduct.127 According to Feinberg, governments historically have
used four basic "liberty-limiting" (or "coercion-legitimizing") princi-
ples to justify the criminalization of certain conduct. First, the
"harm principle" holds that criminal law is necessary to prevent
harm or injury to persons other than the actor. 128 Second, the "of-
fense principle" holds that criminal law is necessary to prevent hurt
or offense to persons other than the actor. 129 Third, "legal paternal-
123. LAWRENC E M. FRDMAN, CRIME AND PUNISHMENT IN AMERICAN ISTORY 4
(1993) (emphasis in original).
124. Id. at 3-4. For example, lying, psychological abuse, or charging a huge
markup at a restaurant or store. Id.
125. Id. at 4.
126. SANFORD H. KADIsH, BLAME AND PuNiHmErr: ESSAYS IN TiE CRIMINAL LAW
33 (1987).
127. JOEL FEInBERG, 2 Tim MORAL LmTs OF THiE CRudmNAL LAw: OFFENSE TO
OTHERS, ix (1985) [hereinafter OFFENSE TO OrHERS].
128. Harm is a violation of another's rights that sets back the other's interests.
JOEL FEINBERG, 1 THiE MORAL LIMrs OF TIE CRIMNAL LAW: HARM TO O=HERS 2
(1984) [hereinafter HARM TO OTIERs]. Feinberg suggests six factors to determine
whether a harm is significant enough to warrant criminal prohibition: 1) the magni-
tude of the harm, 2) the probability of the harm, 3) the aggregate harm (when an
activity has some benefits and some harms such as alcohol consumption), 4) statisti-
cal discrimination and the net reduction of harm (e.g., prohibiting minors from
drinking), 5) the relative importance of the harm when there are conflicting inter-
ests, and 6) the liberty interests at stake. Id. at 187-217.
129. Id. OFFENSE TO OTHERs, supra note 127, at 2. Feinberg defines a "wrongful
offense" as a violation of another's rights that causes the other "to experience a
mental state of a universally disliked kind (e.g., disgust, shame)." Id. Feinberg de-
scribes six categories of offense: 1) affronts to the senses, 2) disgust and revulsion, 3)
shock to moral, religious, or patriotic sensibilities, 4) shame, embarrassment (includ-
ing vicarious embarrassment), and anxiety, 5) annoyance, boredom, and frustration,
and 6) fear, resentment, humiliation, and anger (from empty threats, insults, mock-
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ism" holds that criminal law "is necessary to prevent harm to the
very person it prohibits from acting, as opposed to others."130 Fi-
nally, "legal moralism" holds that "it is necessary to prevent inher-
ently immoral conduct whether or not such conduct is harmful or
offensive to anyone."13 1
As Feinberg noted, most people would agree that harm to
others is a valid justification for criminal laws. 132 However, there
is much disagreement about whether offense, harm to self, or mo-
rality can justify criminal laws. 133 Many have argued that regula-
tion of private morality is a proper function of criminal law.134
However, others argue that American society has fallen into a pat-
tern of overcriminalization based on moralistic criminal laws. John
Stuart Mill argued that "the only purpose for which power can be
rightfully exercised over any member of a civilized community,
against his will, is to prevent harm to others. His own good, either
physical or moral, is not a sufficient warrant."l3 5 Norval Morris
and Gordon Hawkins condemned the "moralistic excrescences on
ery, flaunting, or taunting). Id. at 10-13. The seriousness of an offense is deter-
mined by weighing the interests of both parties. Id. at 34. The interests of the
victim are weighed by the following factors: "[the magnitude of the offense which is
a function of its intensity, duration, and extent"; "the standard of reasonable
avoidability"; "whether the risk was voluntarily incurred or voluntarily assumed";
and the "discounting of abnormal susceptibilities." Id. at 35. Against these factors
are weighed the reasonableness of the offender's conduct, determined by six factors:
personal importance, social value, free expression, alternative opportunities, malice
and spite, and nature of the locality. Id. at 37-42.
130. See JOEL FEINBERG, THE MORAL LIMITs OF THE CRIMNAL LAW: HARM TO SELF
(1986) [hereinafter HARM To SELF]. The criminalization of suicide is an example of
legal paternalism. Id. at 9.
131. OFFENSE To OTHERS, supra note 127, at ix-x; see JOEL FEINBERG, 4 THE
MORAL LIMITS OF THE CRImINAL LAw: HARMLEss WRONGDOING (1988) [hereinafter
HARMLuESS WRONGDOING].
132. OFFENSE TO OTHERS, supra note 127, at ix. According to Feinberg,
"[clontroversy arises when we consider whether [harm] is the only valid liberty-lim-
iting principle." Id.
133. Id. at ix-x. "Liberalism" has historically accepted the harm and offense prin-
ciples as the only justifications for criminal prohibitions. Id. "Extreme liberalism,"
according to Feinberg, rejects the offense principle, holding that only the harm prin-
ciple justifies criminal prohibitions. Id. at x. Liberals reject paternalism and moral-
ism as legitimate justifications for criminal law. Id.
134. JAES F. STEPHEN, LIBERTY, EQUALrY, FRATE~m (R.J. White ed., Cam-
bridge University Press 1967) (1873) (arguing for "morally intolerant legislation");
PATRICK DEVLIN, THE ENFORCEMENT OF MORAS 22 (1965) (arguing that "law exists
for the protection of society. It does not discharge its function by protecting the indi-
vidual from injury, annoyance, corruption, and exploitation; the law must protect
also the institutions and the community of ideas, political and moral, without which
people cannot live together").
135. JOHN STUART MILL, ON LmERTY, 13 (Currin V. Shields ed., Bobbs-Merrill Co.
1955); see also H.L.A. HART, LAW, LmERTY AND MoRALrrY (1963) (arguing against
using morality to justify criminal laws, particularly with sexual morality); KADIsH,
supra note 126, at 21-39 (essays on the crisis of overcriminalization).
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our criminal justice system"136 and argued that the only valid justi-
fication for criminal law is "to protect our persons and our prop-
erty."13 7 According to Morris and Hawkins, people have "an
inalienable right to go to hell in [their] own fashion, provided [they
do] not directly injure the person or property of another on the
way."1ss They advocated for the abolishment of criminal laws
prohibiting drunkenness, narcotics and drug abuse, gambling, dis-
orderly conduct and vagrancy, abortion, sexual behavior between
consenting adults, and juvenile delinquency. 139
Feinberg argued for using only the harm and offense princi-
ples to justify criminal laws.140 He qualified his argument for the
offense principle by stating that criminal law should not attempt to
control offensiveness when other modes of regulation are equally
efficient and economical, such as injunctions, administrative orders,
and license withdrawals.141 However, he argued that in some cir-
cumstances, civil actions will be insufficient to control offensive con-
duct. 142 Therefore, some offensive acts should be crimes, but only
misdemeanors and the penalties should be light.143
One could argue for the criminalization of sexual harassment
on the grounds of offense, paternalism, and moralism, but this is
not necessary. The criminalization of quid pro quo sexual harass-
ment is justified by the harm principle alone, the one universally
accepted ground for criminalization. The next section will use the
harm principle to argue that quid pro quo sexual harassment
should be treated as a crime.
B. Quid Pro Quo Sexual Harassment is Criminal
Quid pro quo sexual harassment should be treated as a crime
because it harms the public. It harms not only individual wo-
men,144 but also women as a group, employers of harassers, and
society as a whole. The legal history of sexual harassment reveals a
movement away from the view that sexual harassment is a per-
136. NORVAL MoRRis & GORDON HAwKUNS, TE HONEST POLMCL'S GUIDE TO
CmME CoNTRoL 2 (1970).
137. Id.
138. Id.
139. Id. at 3.
140. OFFENSE TO OTHERS, supra note 127, at 1-4 (arguing against paternalism
and moralism). See HARM TO SELF, supra note 130; HARMLESS WRONGDOING, supra
note 131.
141. OFFENSE TO OTHERS, supra note 127, at 3.
142. Id.
143. Id. at 4.
144. Men are also victims of sexual harassment, however, at a much lower rate
than women. See PALuDi & BARiCKMAN, supra note 21, at 14.
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sonal, individual phenomenon, toward the view that it harms wo-
men as a group. In the first reported sexual harassment case, the
judge rejected the plaintiff's claim on the ground that the alleged
sexual harassment was merely a matter of the "personal proclivity,
peculiarity or mannerism" of the male supervisor and that nothing
in Title VII prohibited verbal and physical advances where the con-
duct had "no relationship to the nature of the employment."145 In
the early years, courts generally held that sexual harassment in the
workplace was private conduct, and not meant to fall within the
Title VII prohibition against sex discrimination in employment. 146
In 1979, Professor Catharine MacKinnon proposed the revolu-
tionary theory that sexual harassment was a social phenomenon
reinforcing sex roles, not just a personal offense.147 She argued
that sexual harassment derived its "meaning and detrimental im-
pact upon women not from personality or biology, but from this so-
cial content."148 In other words, sexual harassment reinforced a
social hierarchy in which women as a group occupied a structurally
inferior and distinct place.149 MacKinnon thereby shifted the para-
digm; she recognized that sexual harassment was not only a wrong
against individual women, but a wrong against women as a
group.150 She argued that sexual harassment perpetuated perva-
sive sexism in the workplace, thus constituting a formidable barrier
to equal opportunity for women in the workforce.15 1
Several commentators have agreed with MacKinnon that sex-
ual harassment reinforces women's subordination in the work-
place. 152 Women as a group are still underpaid and segregated into
traditionally female jobs. Women earn seventy-one cents for every
145. Come v. Bausch & Lomb, Inc., 390 F. Supp. 161, 163 (D. Ariz. 1975); see also
Miller v. Bank of America, 418 F. Supp. 233, 234 (N.D. Cal. 1976) (holding that
plaintiff had alleged "essentially the isolated and unauthorized sex misconduct of
one employee to another," and not an injury actionable under Title VII).
146. "Typically, employers, husbands, judges, and the victims themselves have
understood and dismissed such incidents as trivial, isolated, and 'personal,' or as
universal 'natural' or 'biological' behaviors." CATHARNE A. MACKINON, SExuAL HAR-
ASSMENT OF WORKING WOMEN 2 (1979).
147. Id. at 6 (arguing sexual harassment in the workplace is sexual
discrimination).
148. Id. at 2.
149. Id.
150. Id.
151. Id. at 4.
152. See, e.g., Kathryn Abrams, Gender Discrimination and the Transformation of
Workplace Norms, 42 VA-D L. REv. 1183, 1205-09 (1989) (arguing that sexual har-
assment reinforces women's subordination in the workplace because it is coercive
and it demeans women as workers); Jane L. Dolkart, Hostile Environment Harass-
ment: Equality, Objectivity, and the Shaping of Legal Standards, 43 EMORY L.J. 151,
182-88 (1994) (arguing that sexual harassment "is a means of social control to keep
women in subordinate positions in the workplace").
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dollar earned by men.153 Women are overrepresented in low pay-
ing, traditionally female fields such as secretarial work, bookkeep-
ing, nursing, and administrative/clerical support154  and
underrepresented in many traditionally male fields such as con-
struction, mining, and engineering.155 Men in traditionally female
jobs earn more than women in these positions, and the wage gap is
even greater in traditionally male jobs.156
The high rate of sexual harassment women experience in the
workplace 157 reinforces women's inferior status. Several studies
reveal that the effects of sexual harassment on the work tenure of
individual female workers are often severe. In one study, forty-two
percent of sexual harassment targets left their jobs and another
twenty-four percent were fired.158 The costs of leaving a job include
loss of income and seniority, a disrupted work history, problems
with obtaining references for future jobs, loss of confidence in seek-
ing a new job, and loss of career advancement.159 Numerous stud-
ies reveal that sexual harassment causes women enormous
emotional and physical harm.160 In light of the feminization of pov-
153. U.S. BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, U.S. DEP'T OF COMMERCE, CURRENT POPULA-
TION REPORTS SERIES P-60, No. 184, at xi.(1992).
154. NATIONAL ASS'N FOR FEMALE EXECUTIVES, WOMEN IN THE AMERICAN
WORKFORCE AND POWER STRUCTURE 2 (1993) [hereinafter WOMEN IN THE AMERICAN
WORKFORCE] (reporting that in 1992, women were 99% of secretaries, 93% of book-
keepers and nurses, and 82% of administrative/clerical support workers).
155. BUREAU OF LABOR STATISTICS, U.S. DEP'T OF LABOR, BULLETIN No. 2385,
WORKING WOMEN: A CHARTBOOK 19 (1991) (women represent 11% of construction
workers and 14% of mining workers).
156. WOMEN IN THE AMERICAN WORKFORCE, supra note 154, at 2 (reporting that in
1989 male bookkeepers earned 16% more than females and male registered nurses
earned 10% more than females).
157. See infra notes 158-62 and accompanying text.
158. PEGGY CRULL, THE IMPACT OF SEXUAL HARASSMENT ON TnE JOB: A PROFILE OF
THE EXPERIENCES OF 92 WOMEN (1979); see also BARBARA A. GUTEK, SEX AND THE
WORKPLACE (Jossey Blass, Inc. 1985) (showing private sector workers surveyed re-
ported being fired, not being promoted, not given raises, all because of refusal to
comply with requests for sexual relationships); Frances S. Cole, Forced to Quit: Sex-
ual Harassment Complaints and Agency Response, 14 SEX ROLES 81, 89 (1986) (40
out of 88 sexual harassment victims were fired and 20 out of 88 quit).
159. Dolkart, supra note 152, at 187 (citing Jean A. Hamilton, Emotional Conse-
quences of Victimization and Discrimination in "Special Populations" of Women, 12
PSYCHIATRIC CLINIC N. Am. 35, 161 (1989)); Ronni Sandroff, Sexual Harassment Sur-
vey Results, WORKING WOMAN, June 1992, at 50 (finding numerous ill effects of sex-
ual harassment, including being fired or forced to quit a job, seriously undermined
self-confidence, impaired health, and long term career damage); U.S. MERrr Sys.
PROTECTION BD., supra note 15, at 41-42 (discussing the reported costs of sexual
harassment to victims and estimating that federal employees took annual leave val-
ued at $25.6 million and leave without pay valued at $9.9 million in salaries in order
to avoid harassment).
160. PALUDI & BARICKMAN, supra note 21, at 27-39 (discussing Sexual Harass-
ment Trauma Syndrome, and the effects of harassment on the physical, emotional,
interpersonal, and career aspects of women's lives); IVORY POWER, supra note 21, at
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erty16' and the increasing number of female headed households,162
women's equal access to the workforce, as well as to housing, educa-
tion, and other services, is critical. Sexual harassment deprives
many women of an equal opportunity to pursue an occupation, edu-
cation, housing, and other critical pursuits free from the sexual de-
mands of those in power.
Not only do sexual harassers harm their victims individually,
and women as a group, but they also harm their employers. When
an employee with some degree of power sexually harasses another
person, that employee abuses the power granted by the employer.
For example, when a police officer stops a woman by the side of a
road and harasses her, the law enforcement mission suffers as well
as the woman harassed. In attempting to extort sexual access in
exchange for employment-related benefits, the workplace harasser
abuses the authority granted by the employer, and thus may de-
prive the employer of maximum workforce productivity. Sexual
harassment not only can impair the harassed employee's productiv-
ity, but it can also reduce the productivity of other workers through
harm to morale in the workplace. Sexual harassment cost the fed-
eral government an estimated $267,000,000 between May of 1985
and May of 1987 because of job turnover, increased sick leave, and
loss of individual and work group productivity.163 Another survey
estimated that sexual harassment costs a typical Fortune 500 com-
pany as much as $6.7 million a year due to absenteeism, turnover,
and lost productivity. 1 6 4 In addition, the harasser subjects the em-
73-123 (finding that many women report that their emotional and physical condition
deteriorated as a result of sexual harassment); Dolkart, supra note 152, at 226-33
(discussing the psychological impact of sexual harassment on women and how wo-
men's responses to sexual harassment differ).
161. "Feminization of poverty" means the increasing number of women in poverty
as compared to men. HILDA ScoT, WORKING YOUR WAY To THE BoTToM: THE FEIm-
NIZATION OF POVERTY (1984) (discussing how women are increasingly economically
responsible for children but that job segregation and the income gap between men
and women are still great); Diane Pearce, The Feminization of Poverty: Women,
Work, and Welfare, 11 URB. & Soc. CHANGE REV. 28 (1978) (coining the phrase "femi-
nization of poverty").
162. HARRELL R. RODGERS, JR., POOR WOMEN, POOR FAmIU~s: THE ECONOMIC
PLIGHT OF AMERICA's FEMALE-HEADED HousEHoLDs 3 (M.E. Sharpe, Inc., 1991) (stat-
ing that the "largest group of poor people in America is made up of single women and
their children"); DAVID T. ELLWOOD, POOR SUPPORT, POVERTY IN THE AMERicAN FAM-
ILY 45-80, 128-88 (Basic Books, Inc. 1988) (reporting that in 1985, 20% of families
with children were headed by single females and 50% of children in single-parent
families lived in poverty).
163. U.S. MERIT Sys. PROTECTION BOARD, supra note 15, at 40. The Senate passed
a resolution in 1991 condemning sexual harassment in the federal government. S.
Res. 209, 102d Cong., 1st Sess., 137 CONG. REC. 15290 (1991).
164. Sandroff, supra note 16, at 69.
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ployer to significant potential civil liability under Title VII for sex-
ual harassment. 165
Sexual harassment is a serious and pervasive problem not
only in the workforce, but also in education166 and housing.167 Stu-
dents subjected to sexual harassment typically change their major
or educational program and report physical and emotional reac-
tions including depression, insomnia, headaches, and decreased
motivation.16 8 Targets of sexual harassment in rental housing re-
port that their harassers threaten to evict them or to withhold nec-
essary repairs or services. 16 9
The economic cost of sexual harassment to society is great.
Sexual harassment is not just a private wrong; sexual harassment
affects the ability of women as a group to function in society and
impairs the functioning of business and government. Under the
narrowest principle of criminalization-the harm principle170 -
quid pro quo sexual harassment should be treated as a crime. Ap-
plying the harm principle, sexual harassment warrants criminal
prohibition because the magnitude and probability of harm result-
ing from quid pro quo sexual harassment are great. States should
treat quid pro quo sexual harassment as a crime in order to protect
society and individuals from harassers' inappropriate exercise of
power. 171
Several objections may be made to criminalizing quid pro quo
sexual harassment. First, some may argue that criminal laws are
unnecessary because civil laws adequately and more effectively ad-
dress the problem of sexual harassment. The trend has been to-
ward using civil causes of action to compensate victims of rape and
165. See supra note 52 and accompanying text.
166. See supra notes 19-22 and accompanying text.
167. See supra notes 23-24 and accompanying text.
168. PALuDI & BAmcKMAN, supra note 21, at 27-34; see also IVORY POWER, supra
note 21, at 67-118 (discussing the impact of sexual harassment on cognitive, physi-
cal, and emotional well-being).
169. Cahan, supra note 24, at 1073-75.
170. See supra note 118 and accompanying text.
171. Beyond the harm principle, moral principles justify criminalizing sexual har-
assment. Sexual harassment involves the moral wrongs of coercion and exploitation.
See Scott Altman, A Patchwork Theory of Blacknail, 141 U. PA. L. REV. 1639, 1640
(1993) (arguing that in profiting from victims' vulnerability, "[b]lackmailers commit
two serious moral wrongs-coercion and exploitation-that justify condemnation
and prohibition"). A harasser subjects his victim to moral duress by "taking...
undue advantage of business or financial stress or extreme necessity or weakness of
another." BLAci's, supra note 115, at 1008 (defining moral duress). A criminal law
against quid pro quo sexual harassment may also serve an educational function. See
Jean Hampton, The Moral Education Theory of Punishment, in CRIMEs AND PUNISH-




other crimes.172 This trend has caused the victims' rights move-
ment to criticize the criminal process for ignoring victims and their
needs.173 The existence of criminal sanctions for a harm against
society does not preclude civil sanctions to protect the individual; in
fact, civil and criminal remedies may complement each other. A
criminal conviction for quid pro quo sexual harassment would not
prevent a civil sexual harassment suit for damages. Even if the de-
fendant is acquitted, a plaintiff could still win a civil case because
the burden of proof is lower in the civil action than in the criminal
action. The only potentially negative effect of criminal proceedings
would be a delay in deposing the defendant in the civil sexual har-
assment case until after the completion of the criminal proceedings
because of the Fifth Amendment right against self-incrimina-
tion.174 While the criminalization of sexual harassment may create
some delays in civil trials, this inconvenience does not outweigh the
benefits of making sexual harassment a crime.
One might also argue that the crime of quid pro quo sexual
harassment will be difficult to prove and rarely enforced. Some
cases will have tape recordings or documents to show the harass-
ment, but often the case will come down to the victim's word
against the accused's word. In addition, the laws may be rarely en-
forced because prosecutors are overburdened with violent crimes.
The difficulty in proving a claim and the likelihood of enforcement
should be considered in deciding whether to adopt a law,1 75 but
should not be dispositive. Many crimes, such as extortion and brib-
ery, have similar proof problems in that the evidence may consist
only of one person's word against another's.176 These laws, how-
ever, remain important because they set a standard with which
community members are expected to comply. Even if sexual har-
assment is rarely prosecuted under criminal laws, these laws still
172. For example, Title III of the Violence Against Women Act recently passed by
Congress provides that violence directed against women on the basis of their gender
is a civil rights violation. The Act allows victims to sue their attackers for compensa-
tion. See W.H. Hallock, The Violence Against Women Act: Civil Rights for Sexual
Assault Victims, 68 IND. L.J. 577, 600 (1993) (discussing how sexual assault victims
are turning increasingly to civil remedies for compensation for the harms of sexual
assault).
173. See Karen L. Kennard, Comment, The Victim's Veto: A Way to Increase Vic-
tim Impact on Criminal Case Dispositions, 77 CALn. L. REv. 417 (1989).
174. U.S. CONST. amend. V.
175. See JONATHAN SCHONSHECK, ON CIMINALIZATION: AN EssAY IN THE PHILOSO-
PHm OF CwmnNrnAL LAW (1994) (arguing for the importance of considering the enforce-
ability of laws when deciding whether to adopt them).




represent an important community standard condemning sexual
harassment.
Criminal laws against quid pro quo sexual harassment pro-
vide new tools to combat sexual harassment beyond those offered by
civil law. First, criminal laws enable targets of harassment to pre-
vent the threatened harm. Civil laws require that the target of har-
assment suffer tangible detrimental consequences in order to state
a case. For example, under Title VII, a threat of adverse conse-
quences is insufficient to establish liability; the plaintiff must prove
negative employment consequences.1 7 7 Therefore, a target of har-
assment must wait until she suffers tangible harm before she has a
right to bring a legal claim against the harasser. Once she suffers
tangible harm, she must prove that the harm resulted from her re-
fusal to submit to sexual demands. A criminal law against quid pro
quo sexual harassment, on the other hand, would enable the target
to prevent the tangible harm by reporting the harasser as soon as
the threat is made. The crime of quid pro quo sexual harassment
could go beyond civil law to address the threat made by the har-
asser, not just the tangible detrimental consequence resulting from
the threat.178 Criminalization of quid pro quo sexual harassment
may therefore encourage and assist targets of sexual harassment in
resisting their harasser's demands. The legal right to be free from
sexually harassing threats gives them the leverage of threatening
to go to the police before they suffer a detriment for refusing to con-
sent to sex. 17 9 Finally, criminalizing sexual harassment authorizes
177. 1 LARSON & LARSON, supra note 4, § 41A.42; see, e.g., Watts v. New York City
Police Dep't, 724 F. Supp. 99 (S.D.N.Y. 1989) (threats were not actual employment
decisions); Trautvetter v. Quick, 916 F.2d 1140 (7th Cir. 1990) (denying plaintiff's
claim because she was not discharged, nor denied a promotion or other job benefit).
178. Also, current civil laws often do not provide a cause of action against the
offender, but only against the offender's employer. Titles VII and IX and many state
laws hold employers civilly liable for sexual harassment by superiors in the work-
place and teachers in schools. The actual harassers, however, are not held liable for
their actions by federal law. See, e.g., Miller v. Maxwell's Intl Inc., 991 F.2d 583,
587 (9th Cir. 1993) (holding that employees lack standing to sue individual co-work-
ers or supervisors for discrimination under Title VII). But see 1 LARSON & LARsON,
supra note 4, § 41A.91(a) (stating that employees of state and local governments
may sue individuals directly for harassing them under § 1983 if they acted under
color of state law); Eastwood v. Department of Corrections, 846 F.2d 627 (10th Cir.
1988) (noting that the defendant employer's investigator was not protected by quali-
fied immunity under § 1983 when sued in his individual capacity). However, a plain-
tiff may sue a harasser directly under state tort law.
179. See Wendy J. Gordon, Truth and Consequences: The Force of Blackmail's
Central Case, 141 U. PA. L. REV. 1741, 1776 (1993) (arguing that blackmail should be
criminalized for these reasons). The criminalization of sexual harassment "rein-
forces [the target's] sense that she has a 'right' to be free from such threats, and thus
reinforces her willingness to angrily refuse the demands made." Id. at 1778. A tar-
get now has the threat of a civil suit if the harasser carries through with his threat
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the state to prosecute offenders. Civil laws against harassment put
the burden upon the victim to pursue a harassment claim. Victims
often do not have the money, time, or access to information about
how to pursue these remedies. Criminal sexual harassment laws
would sanction the state to prosecute sexual harassers.
Another objection is that a criminal conviction for quid pro quo
sexual harassment might cut off employer civil liability for sexual
harassment suits brought by their employees. Under Title VII, an
employer is strictly liable for quid pro quo sexual harassment.180
However, courts normally consider whether the employee's conduct
was within the scope of employment.' 8 ' The fact that quid pro quo
sexual harassment is a crime strengthens the argument that the
act was outside the employee's scope of employment. An employer's
duty to exercise reasonable care in providing a safe workplace to
employees does not extend to the prevention of unlikely or unfore-
seeable occurrences, but only to dangers that may reasonably be
anticipated. 18 2 An employer would have a strong argument that a
criminal act was not reasonably anticipated. However, considering
that the employee used authority granted by the employer in order
to harass, that quid pro quo sexual harassment is foreseeable in the
workplace, and that strong precedent exists for holding employers
strictly liable for quid pro quo sexual harassment, the criminaliza-
tion of this behavior would probably not expunge employer liability.
A final objection is that there are First Amendment problems
with the criminalization of sexual harassment.' 8 3 However, many
(usually against employers, but also against the harassers in some cases, see supra
part I.B.), but the threat of going to the police is much more impressive.
180. See supra note 52 and accompanying text.
181. 1 LARSON & LARSON, supra note 4, § 41A.63.
182. ALFRED G. GELIU, PRIMER ON INDvmuIAL EMPLOYEE RIGHTS 267 (1992); see,
e.g., Vallejo v. Osco Drug, 743 S.W.2d 423 (Mo. App. 1987) (finding no liability under
duty to provide a safe workplace for a store owner whose security guard shot an
employee during an attempted robbery because the act was clearly outside the scope
of employment).
183. There is a debate in the literature as to whether sexual harassment laws,
particularly hostile environment harassment laws, violate free speech rights. Com-
pare Kingsley R. Browne, Title VII as Censorship: Hostile-Environment Harassment
and the First Amendment, 52 Omo ST. L.J. 481 (1991) (arguing that allowing evi-
dence of verbal expressions of discrimination into a consideration of sexual harass-
ment charges infringes First Amendment rights and has a chilling effect on the
workplace) with Rodney A. Smolla, Rethinking First Amendment Assumptions About
Racist and Sexist Speech, 47 WASH. & LEE L. REv. 171, 197 (1990) (arguing that the
transactional setting of sexual harassment opens sexist speech to regulation); Marcy
Strauss, Sexist Speech in the Workplace, 25 HARv. C.R.-C.L. L. REv. 1, 38-41 (recom-
mending a balancing test between the state's interest in eradicating sexist speech
from the workplace and free speech rights, paying particular attention to whether
the speech is directed at a particular woman, whether it is discriminatory, and con-
siderations of the employment context, e.g. captive audience).
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acts that take the form of speech are crimes unprotected by the
First Amendment, such as treason,' 8 4 blackmail, or laws against
soliciting bribes. The Supreme Court recently reaffirmed this prin-
ciple in R.AV. v. City of St. Paul:
Since words can in some circumstances violate laws directed
not against speech but against conduct (a law against treason,
for example, is violated by telling the nation's defense secrets),
a particular content-based subcategory of a proscribable class of
speech can be swept up incidentally within the reach of a stat-
ute directed at conduct rather than speech. 8 5
Laws against quid pro quo sexual harassment are directed at words
that function as conduct.186
Despite some possible drawbacks, sexual harassment should
be treated as a crime. The coercion and exploitation of sexual har-
assment cause sufficient harm to justify criminalization. Criminal
law would forcefully address this serious problem that affects large
numbers of women in American society.' 8 7 Punishment not only
would serve an educational purpose by teaching that harassment is
unacceptable behavior, 188 but also would deter sexual harassment.
Criminal law sanctions would complement currently existing civil
law sanctions. The next Part will explore whether quid pro quo sex-
ual harassment falls within traditional general criminal laws.
M. Prosecuting Quid Pro Quo Sexual Harassment Under
General Criminal Laws
If states make the commitment to prosecute quid pro quo sex-
ual harassers, they may look to their existing laws or they may
adopt new criminal statutes specifically addressing quid pro quo
sexual harassment. Many states have general criminal laws that
prohibit some types of quid pro quo sexual harassment. However,
only a few have laws that prohibit all types. This Part analyzes six
general criminal laws to determine whether these laws could ade-
quately address quid pro quo sexual harassment: soliciting com-
mercial bribes, extortion, criminal coercion, criminal solicitation,
attempted offensive sexual touching, and harassment.
Many states have criminal laws against soliciting commercial
bribes, which may encompass some types of quid pro quo sexual
184. See 18 U.S.C. § 2385 (1993) (punishing those advocating the overthrow of the
government with up to 20 years in prison and/or a fine of up to $20,000).
185. 112 S. Ct. 2538, 2546 (1992).
186. One court rejected a First Amendment challenge to a sexual solicitation stat-
ute on the grounds that the solicitation constituted "fighting words." Ohio v. Phipps,
389 N.E.2d 1128 (Ohio 1979).
187. See supra notes 14-24 and accompanying text.
188. Hampton, supra note 171, at 494.
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harassment. Most commercial bribery statutes prohibit an em-
ployee or agent from soliciting a benefit from another person under
the "understanding that such benefit will influence his conduct in
relation to his employer's or principal's affairs."189 These statutes
could cover quid pro quo sexual harassment, but only when the har-
asser is an employee or agent. Some commercial bribery statutes
are broader. Colorado has a law against "commercial bribery and
breach of duty to act disinterestedly," which covers not only employ-
ees, but also fiduciaries, professional advisors, and people who hold
themselves out to the public as being engaged in the business of
making disinterested selection, appraisal, or criticism of commodi-
ties, property, or services.19 0 Probably all types of quid pro quo sex-
ual harassment would fall under this statute. Few states, however,
have statutes this broad.
Quid pro quo sexual harassment may also fall within extortion
laws. Extortion laws usually prohibit obtaining the property of an-
other by threatening to cause certain harms like inflicting bodily
injury, accusing of a crime, or exposing an incriminating secret.19 1
189. CHARLEs E. TORCIA, 4 WHARTON'S CRmMHNAL LAW § 693 (1978 & Supp. 1993);
see, e.g., CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 53A-161 (West 1985); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 11,
§ 882 (Supp. 1992) (covering "action with regard to his employer's or principal's af-
fairs which would not be warranted upon reasonable consideration of the factors
which he should have taken into account"); ILL. ANN. REV. STAT. ch. 720, para. 5/29A-
1 (Smith-Hurd 1993); IOWA CODE ANN. § 722.10 (West 1993) (covering an action
which "the employee has reason to know is in conflict with the employment relation
and duties of the employee to the employer").
190. The Colorado statute provides:
(1) A person commits a class 6 felony if he solicits, accepts, or agrees to
accept any benefit as consideration for knowingly violating or agreeing
to violate a duty of fidelity to which he is subject as:
(a) Agent or employee; or
(b) Trustee, guardian, or other fiduciary; or
(c) Lawyer, physician, accountant, appraiser, or other professional
advisor; or
(d) Officer, director, partner, manager, or other participant in the
direction of the affairs of an incorporated or unincorporated association;
or
(e) Duly elected or appointed representative or trustee of a labor
organization or employee welfare trust fund; or
(f) Arbitrator or other purportedly disinterested adjudicator or
referee.
(2) A person who holds himself out to the public as being engaged in
the business of making disinterested selection, appraisal, or criticism of
commodities, property, or services commits a class 6 felony if he know-
ingly solicits, accepts, or agrees to accept any benefit to alter, modify, or
change his selection, appraisal, or criticism.
CoLo. REv. STAT. ANN. § 18-5-401 (Supp. 1992); see also, e.g., NEB. REV. $TAT. § 28-
613 (Supp. 1992); 18 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 4108 (Supp. 1993).
191. MPC, supra note 118, § 223.4. The Model Penal Code includes the following
threats:
A person is guilty of [extortion] if he obtains property of another by
threatening to: (1) inflict bodily injury on anyone or commit any other
1994]
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Many extortion statutes cover demands for "property" or "chat-
tel."192 Some speak more broadly of "pecuniary advantage" or "any-
thing of value."193 A few cover threats made to induce the victim to
do "any act against [the victim's] will."19 4 Washington state specifi-
cally includes demands for "sexual favors."195 Quid pro quo sexual
harassment is sexual extortion. By threatening to deny or with-
draw benefits from a victim, the harasser attempts to induce her to
comply with his sexual demands.196 Many extortion laws, however,
criminal offense; or (2) accuse anyone of a criminal offense; or (3) expose
any secret tending to subject any person to hatred, contempt or ridicule,
or to impair his credit or business repute; or (4) take or withhold action
as an official, or cause an official to take or withhold action; or (5) bring
about or continue a strike, boycott or other collective unofficial action, if
the property is not demanded or received for the benefit of the group in
whose interest the actor purports to act; or (6) testify or provide infor-
mation or withhold testimony or information with respect to another's
legal claim or defense; or (7) inflict any other harm which would not
benefit the actor.
Id.; see also BLAcK's, supra note 115, at 585 (defining extortion as the "obtaining of
property from another induced by wrongful use of actual or threatened force, vio-
lence, or fear, or under color of official right"); see, e.g., DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 11, § 846
(Supp. 1992). The United States Code defines extortion as the 'obtaining of property
from another, with his consent, induced by wrongful use of actual or threatened
force, violence, or fear, or under color of official right.' 18 U.S.C. § 1951 (1988). Rob-
bery, on the other hand, is obtaining another's property by means of a threat of im-
mediate bodily harm to the victim (or a companion). Robbery requires that the
defendant actually acquire the victim's property as a result of a threat, and that the
property be taken from the person or in the presence of the victim. LAFAVE & Sco'ir,
supra note 111, § 8.11. Robbery also historically has been defined to include threats
to destroy a victim's home or threats to accuse the victim of sodomy. Other threats,
however, have not been included in the definition of robbery, such as the threat to
inflict future bodily harm, to destroy property other than one's home, to accuse an-
other of some crime other than sodomy, or to damage the victim's good name or repu-
tation. However, states have filled the gap by creating the crimes of extortion and
blackmail, which carry a less severe penalty than robbery, but are very similar. Id.
§ 8.12.
192. LAFAvE & ScoTt, supra note 111, § 8.12. The Model Penal Code defines
"property" as "anything of value, including real estate, tangible and intangible per-
sonal property, contract rights, choses-in-action, and other interests in or claims to
wealth, admission or transportation tickets, captured or domestic animals, food and
drink, electric or other power." MPC, supra note 118, § 223.0(6).
193. LAFAVE & ScoT, supra note 111, § 8.12.
194. Id.; see Furlotte v. State, 350 S.W.2d 72 (Tenn. 1961) (involving a defendant
who induced victim by threats to sign a statement admitting an illicit love affair
with the defendant's wife).
195. WASH. REv. CODE ANw. § 9A.56.110 (West 1988).
196. Sometimes the distinction between extortion and bribery is unclear. For ex-
ample, in a recent case in the Southern District of New York, the director of a half-
way house under federal contract gave special benefits (such as passes to leave the
house) to certain residents who agreed to have sex with him. The defendant pleaded
guilty to receiving bribes in the form of sexual favors. The court refused to find that
the director had extorted sex by threatening the residents, despite evidence that the
defendant approached several residents offering them benefits for sex and that he
controlled all aspects of their life in the halfway house, including whether they
would be sent back to prison. United States v. Alter, 788 F. Supp. 756 (S.D.N.Y.
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require the actual acquisition of the thing demanded. 19 7 Therefore,
a woman would have to submit to her harasser's sexual demands
before he would be criminally liable. However, the state could pros-
ecute a harasser on attempted extortion in the absence of a victim's
submission to sexual demands. But, as with commercial bribes,
quid pro quo sexual harassment would fall only within the broadest
of extortion laws-those that cover sexual acts. While some states'
statutes would include quid pro quo sexual harassment, many
would not.
Sexual harassment also resembles the crime of criminal coer-
cion because the harasser tries to coerce another by threatening to
act to her detriment. Criminal coercion is "unlawfully restricting
another's freedom of action to his detriment [by] threaten[ing] to...
take or withhold action as an official, or cause an official to take or
withhold action."198 The application of this law to sexual harass-
ment would be very narrow, however, because it only applies to
public officials. Anyone who has authority or power can threaten to
subject another to detrimental action for the wrongful purpose of
demanding sex. Also, this statute would not apply when the quid
pro quo sexual harassment involves offering a benefit in exchange
* for sexual conduct.
Criminal solicitation may also include sexual harassment.
Criminal solicitation occurs when a person commands, encourages,
requests, entices, advises, or incites another person to commit a
crime. 199 "The crime solicited need not be committed." 20 0 Quid pro
1992). See James Lindgren, The Theory, History, and Practice of the Bribery-Extor-
tion Distinction, 141 U. PA. L. REv. 1695 (1993). With the crime of sexual harass-
ment, the distinction between extortion and bribery should revolve around who
initiated the negotiation and a consideration of the power relationship involved.
197. LAFAVE & ScOmt, supra notes 190-91; see, e.g., WASH. REv. CODE ANN.
§ 9A.56.110 (West 1988); VA. CODE ANN. § 18.2-59 (Mitchie 1988).
198. MPC, supra note 118, § 212.5(1). In more complete form, the model statute
provides that a "person is guilty of criminal coercion if, with purpose unlawfully to
restrict another's freedom of action to his detriment, he threatens to: (a) commit any
criminal offense; or (b) accuse anyone of a criminal offense; or (c) expose any secret
tending to subject any person to hatred, contempt or ridicule, or to impair his credit
or business repute; or (d) take or withhold action as an official, or cause an official to
take or withhold action." Id. § 212.5. Many states have adopted this type of crimi-
nal coercion law. See, e.g., ALAsKA STAT. § 11.41.530 (1989); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 11,
§ 791 (1987); O1. REv. STAT. § 163.275 (1990). The Model Penal Code does not define
the term "official." However, the term historically means under color of public office.
See James Lindgren, The Elusive Distinction Between Bribery and Extortion: From
the Common Law to the Hobbs Act, 35 UCLA L. REv. 815 (1988).
199. LAFAVE & Scorr, supra note 111, § 6.1 at 486. Some solicitation statutes
cover all crimes, some cover only the solicitation of felonies or certain classes of felo-
nies, and some cover only specified offenses. Id. § 6.1(a), at 487. Solicitation is gen-
erally considered to be a crime one grade below the solicited offense. Id. However,
some statutes authorize punishment equivalent to that of the solicited crime. Id.;
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quo sexual harassment may be characterized as the solicitation of
another to engage in the crime of prostitution. In offering benefits
for sex, sexual harassers ask their targets to prostitute themselves.
Similarly, quid pro quo sexual harassment could be prosecuted
under laws prohibiting the solicitation of illegal sexual acts 2Ol or
under laws that prohibit the solicitation of sex in return for a fee.202
However, none of these existing criminal laws capture the nature of
sexual harassment. The element of coercion present in quid pro
quo sexual harassment is missing from criminal solicitation stat-
utes. Additionally, the law should not have to characterize a target
of harassment as a prostitute in order to prosecute her harasser.
Finally, in many cases, the harasser abuses authority vested in him
by an employer, an aspect absent from criminal solicitation
statutes.20 3
see also 4 TORCIA, supra note 189, § 713, at 511, 514; see, e.g., ALAsKA STAT.
§ 11.31.110 (1989); ARK. CODE ANN. § 5-3.301 (Michie 1987); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 11,
§ 501-503 (Supp. 1992); HAw. REv. STAT. 705-510 (1994); VA. CODE ANN. § 18.2-29
(Michie Supp. 1994). The Model Penal Code defines criminal solicitation as follows:
"A person is guilty of solicitation to commit a crime if with the purpose of promoting
or facilitating its commission he commands, encourages or requests another person
to engage in specific conduct that would constitute such crime or an attempt to com-
mit such crime or would establish his complicity in its commission or attempted com-
mission." MPC, supra note 118, § 5.02(1). Under the Model Penal Code, criminal
solicitation is a crime of the same grade and degree as the most serious offense which
is solicited. Id. § 5.05(1). Prostitution is a petty misdemeanor in the Model Penal
Code. Id. § 251.2(1).
200. LAFAvE & ScoTr, supra note 111, § 6.1, at 486. See also, MPC supra note
118, § 5.02, cmt. 3.
201. See GA. CODE ANN. § 16-6-15 (Michie 1992) (prohibiting solicitation of
sodomy).
202. Several types of laws prohibit solicitation of sex in return for a fee such as
laws against promoting prostitution, patronizing prostitutes, or pandering. See
CHARLEs E. TORcIA, 2 WlARToN's CRIMINAL LAw, §§ 273-74 (1979); MPC, supra note
118, §§ 251.2(2) & 251.2(5); see, e.g., ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 38, para. 11-15(a) (Smith-
Hurd Supp. 1992) (prohibiting soliciting for a prostitute); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN.
§ 53a-86(a) (West 1985) ("A person is guilty of promoting prostitution in the first
degree when he knowingly: (1) Advances prostitution by compelling a person by force
or intimidation to engage in prostitution... "); GA. CODE ANN. § 16-6-12 (1992) ("A
person commits the offense of pandering when he or she solicits a person to perform
an act of prostitution . . . ."); ARY. CODE ANN. § 5-70-103 (Michie 1987) (providing
that "(a) A person commits the offense of patronizing a prostitute if he: (1) Pays or
agrees to pay a fee to another person on an understanding that in return that person
or a third person will engage in sexual activity with him; or (2) Solicits or requests
another person to engage in sexual activity with him in return for a fee").
203. Sexual harassment also often occurs between an employee and an employer,
a student and a teacher, or others who have an established relationship that is sup-
posedly built on trust, and resembles a fiduciary relationship. The breach of an es-
tablished relationship should be considered more egregious than criminal
solicitation that occurs among strangers or acquaintances. See, e.g., Ronna Greff
Schneider, Sexual Harassment and Higher Education, 65 TEx. L. REv. 525, 551-52
(1987) (arguing that a "faculty-student relationship is best characterized as one of
fiduciary and beneficiary"); BLAcK's, supra note 115, 626 (providing examples of fidu-
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Quid pro quo sexual harassment may also fall within laws
against nonconsensual sexual contact. Several states have laws
against offensive or nonconsensual sexual contact.204 Quid pro quo
sexual harassment could be characterized as attempted offensive
touching. However, this characterization fails to take account of
the unique kind of coercion involved with quid pro quo sexual har-
assment: the harasser uses his position of power as an employer,
lessor, or teacher to coerce his target into complying with sexual
demands. Most rape and sexual assault statutes would not apply
because they require that the offender use or threaten to use force,
that the victim is incapable of consenting, or in certain circum-
stances that the consent is obtained by fraud.205 However, several
sexual assault statutes prohibit sexual contact when "the victim is
in custody of law or detained in a hospital or other institution and
the actor has supervisory or disciplinary authority over the victim
and uses this position of authority to coerce the victim to sub-
mit."2 06 Quid pro quo sexual harassment in an institutional setting
may fall within these laws.
A final crime that may include quid pro quo sexual harass-
ment is the more general crime of harassment. The Model Penal
Code describes harassment as when a person
(1) makes a telephone call without the purpose of legitimate
communication or; (2) insults, taunts or challenges another in a
manner likely to provoke violent or disorderly response or; (3)
makes repeated communications anonymously or at extremely
inconvenient hours, or in offensively coarse language or; (4)
subjects another to offensive touching or; (5) engages in any
other course of alarming conduct serving no legitimate purpose
of the actor.20 7
ciary relations as "those existing between ... guardian and ward, principal and
agent"); see Beverly Balos & Mary Louise Fellows, Guilty of the Crime of Trust: Non-
stranger Rape, 75 MIN. L. REV. 599 (1991) (arguing inter alia that a prior relation-
ship in cases of nonstranger rape imposes on the defendant a heightened duty of care
based on the doctrine of confidential relationship to obtain consent by positive words
or actions).
204. CHARLES E. ToRcIA, 3 WHARToN's CRmuNAL LAw § 298-300 (1980); see, e.g.,
DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 11, § 767 (Supp. 1992) (defining unlawful sexual contact in the
third degree as contact that is "either offensive to the victim or occurs without the
victim's consent"); OHIo REv. CODE ANN. § 2907.06 (Baldwin 1993) (defining the
crime of "sexual imposition" as having sexual contact with another when the "of-
fender knows that the sexual contact is offensive to the other person... or is reckless
in that regard"); OR. REv. STAT. § 163.415 (Supp. 1993) (sexual abuse in the third
degree).
205. 3 TORCIA, supra note 204, §§ 288-290.
206. COLO REv. STAT. ANN. § 18-3-403(1)(g) (West 1986); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN.
§ 53a-73a(a)(1)(E) (West Supp. 1994). See also 3 TORCiA, supra note 204, § 297.
207. MPC, supra note 118, § 250.4.
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Many states have adopted this type of harassment statute.208 This
statute, however, would not be useful to prosecute quid pro quo sex-
ual harassment, which often does not involve telephone calls, re-
peated communications, behaviors likely to provoke violence, or
offensive touching. Quid pro quo sexual harassment is alarming
conduct serving no legitimate purpose. However, this definition
does not fully capture the nature of sexual harassment, which is the
attempt to coerce another into sexual behavior by using one's posi-
tion of authority. Also, state harassment laws are often narrower
than the Model Penal Code provision.209
Sexual harassment may fall under some of the above existing
criminal statutes.210 In many ways, however, sexual harassment is
unique. Most states do not have general laws that comprehensively
prohibit quid pro quo sexual harassment. Therefore, states that
want to criminally prosecute harassers should adopt specific crimi-
nal laws against quid pro quo sexual harassment. Even in states
where quid pro quo sexual harassment may fall within a different
statute, there is still value in having a law explicitly prohibiting
sexual harassment because it proclaims a strong state commitment
to combat sexual harassment.
IV. The Crime of Quid Pro Quo Sexual Harassment
Three states have criminal laws explicitly forbidding sexual
harassment: North Carolina prohibits sexual harassment in the
lessor-lessee relationship,211 Texas prohibits sexual harassment by
208. See, e.g., DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 11, §§ 1311-12 (Supp. 1992); Ky. REV. STAT.
ANN. § 525.070 (Baldwin 1990). The Kentucky law provides:
(1) A person is guilty of harassment when with intent to harass, annoy
or alarm another person he:
(a) Strikes, shoves, kicks or otherwise subjects him to physical contact
or attempts or threatens to do the same; or
(b) In a public place, makes an offensively coarse utterance, gesture or
display, or addresses abusive language to any person present; or
(c) Follows a person in or about a public place or places; or
(d) Engages in a course of conduct or repeatedly commits acts which
alarm or seriously annoy such other person and which serve no legiti-
mate purpose.
Ky. REv. STAT. ANN. § 525.070. Hostile work environment sexual harassment might
fall under the crime of harassment.
209. See, e.g., NY PENAL LAw § 240.25 (Consol. 1994). "A person is guilty of har-
assment in the first degree when he or she intentionally and repeatedly harasses
another person by following such person in or about a public place or places or by
engaging in a course of conduct or by repeatedly committing acts which places such
person in reasonable fear of physical injury." Id.
210. Some states have criminal laws that implicitly prohibit sexual harassment.
See, e.g., IOWA CODE § 729.4 (1993) (providing that sex discrimination in employ-
ment is a simple misdemeanor. This may be read to include sexual harassment.).
211. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 14-395.1 (Supp. 1993).
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public servants,2 12 and Delaware has a general criminal law
against sexual harassment.213 An analysis of these statutes is
helpful in formulating a model quid pro quo sexual harassment
statute.
In 1989, North Carolina passed a law prohibiting lessors of
residential real property or their agents from sexually harassing
lessees or prospective lessees.214 The statute defines harassment to
be "unsolicited overt requests or demands for sexual acts when (i)
submission to such conduct is made a term of the execution or con-
tinuation of the lease agreement, or (ii) submission to or rejection of
such conduct by an individual is used to determine whether rights
under the lease are accorded."215 Sexual harassment under this
statute is a "misdemeanor punishable by [imiprisonment not to ex-
ceed six months, a fine not to exceed two hundred dollars, or
both."216
In response to numerous allegations of sexual harassment by
uniformed and off-duty law enforcement officers,217 Texas recently
criminalized sexual harassment by public officials. The Texas stat-
ute prohibits a "public servant acting under color of his office or
employment [from] intentionally subject[ing] another to sexual har-
assment."21s The statute defines sexual harassment as "unwel-
come sexual advances, requests for sexual favors, or other verbal or
physical conduct of a sexual nature, submission to which is made a
term or condition of a person's exercise or enjoyment of any right,
privilege, power, immunity, either explicitly or implicitly."2 19 Sex-
ual harassment under this law is a Class A misdemeanor. 220
A 1990 Delaware law criminalized sexual harassment gener-
ally. The statute defines sexual harassment as when a person
"threatens to engage in conduct likely to result in the commission of
212. TEXAS PENAL CODE ANN. § 39.03 (West Supp. 1994).
213. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 11, § 763 (Supp. 1992).
214. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 14-3951(a) (Supp. 1993).
215. Id. § 14-395.1(b)(1).
216. Id. § 14-395.1(a).
217. See Roy Bragg, More Women Report Inappropriate Behavior by Police: De-
partments Do Bad Job of Educating Officers, Expert Says, HousTON CHRON., Aug. 8,
1993, at 1A (reporting that there are nine pending cases of sexual harassment by
police in Dallas); Gayle Reaves, Arrested by Fear: Women Say Sexual Abuse by Dal-
las Police Elicits Terror, Lingering Mistrust, DALLAS MORNING NEWS, June 8, 1993,
at 1A (reporting that a bill making it a "felony for public servants to use the power of
their office to coerce sexual acts" passed the Senate, but died on the House calendar).
218. TEXAS PENAL CODE ANN. § 39.03(aX3) (West Supp. 1994). The public servant
acts under color of public office or employment "if he acts or purports to act in an
official capacity or takes advantage of such actual or purported capacity." Id. § 39.03
(b).
219. Id. § 39.02(c).
220. Id. § 39.03.
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a sexual offense against any person"221 or when a person "suggests,
solicits, requests, commands, importunes or otherwise attempts to
induce another person to have sexual contact or sexual intercourse
or unlawful sexual penetration with him, knowing that he is
thereby likely to cause annoyance, offense or alarm to that per-
son."22 2 Sexual harassment is an unclassified misdemeanor.223
All three laws prohibit quid pro quo sexual harassment.22 4 A
comparison of these laws shows how they are similar and how they
differ.225 The North Carolina law uses language very similar to the
EEOC Title VII guidelines, 2 26 as does the Texas statute. The North
Carolina and Texas laws apply to people with a special status, "les-
sor of residential real property 22 7 and "public servant acting under
color of his office or employment,"2 28 whereas the Delaware law ap-
plies to any person.22 9 The type of sexual request covered by the
statutes also differs. The North Carolina law is narrow in that it
covers "unsolicited overt requests or demands for sexual acts,"
23 0
whereas the Texas law is broader-an officer need only "subject"
the victim to certain behaviors.23 1 Delaware steers a middle path
with the language "suggests, solicits, requests, commands, impor-
tunes or otherwise attempts to induce."2 32 Texas also covers the
broadest range of conduct ("unwelcome sexual advances, requests
for sexual favors, or other verbal or physical conduct of a sexual
nature"),23 3 whereas Delaware and North Carolina cover only re-
221. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 11, § 763(1) (Supp. 1992).
222. Id. § 763(2).
223. Id. § 763.
224. The Delaware and Texas laws also appear to prohibit some types of hostile
environment sexual harassment as well.
225. The chart in the Appendix maps the differences among the three criminal
sexual harassment laws. See DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 1, § 763 (Supp. 1992); DEL. CODE
ANN., tit. 11, § 4206 (Supp. 1992); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 14-395.1 (1993); TEXAS PENAL
CODE ANN. § 39.02 (Supp. 1994); TExAs PENAL CODE ANN. § 12.21 (Supp. 1994) (pro-
viding penalties for a class A misdemeanor).
226. 29 C.F.R. § 1604.11 (1991). The EEOC guidelines define 'harassment on the
basis of sex' as
unwelcome sexual advances, requests for sexual favors, and other ver-
bal or physical conduct of a sexual nature [ ] when (1) submission to
such conduct is made either explicitly or implicitly a term or condition
of an individual's employment, (2) submission to or rejection of such
conduct by an individual is used as the basis for employment decisions
affecting such individual ....
Id. (emphasizing language that is the same in the North Carolina statute).
227. N.C. GEN. STAT § 14-395.1 (1993).
228. TEXAs PENAL CODE ANN. § 39.03 (West Supp. 1994).
229. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 11, § 763 (Supp. 1992).
230. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 14-395.1.
231. TEXAS PENAL CODE ANN. § 39.03.
232. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 11, § 763.
233. TExAS PENAL CODE ANN. § 39.03.
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quests for sexual acts.23 4 Both Texas and Delaware cover a broad
range of harm-"annoyance, offense, or alarm"235 in Delaware and
"exercise or enjoyment of any right, privilege, power, or immunity,
either explicitly or implicitly" in Texas.236
The crime of quid pro quo sexual harassment should be called
sexual extortion in order to distinguish it from hostile environment
harassment. An example of a sexual extortion statute would be:
(a) A person is guilty of sexual extortion if the person suggests,
solicits, requests, commands, importunes, or otherwise at-
tempts to induce another person to have sexual contact with
him or her (or anyone else) by threatening to (1) take or with-
hold action related to employment; (2) take or withhold action
on the execution or continuation of a lease agreement, or the
rights accorded under a lease agreement; (3) take or withhold
action related to education; (4) grant or withhold professional
services; (5) take or withhold action as an official, or cause an
official to take or withhold action; (6) grant or withhold any ser-
vice generally held out to the public.
(b) An offense under this section is punishable as follows:
(1) Sexual extortion by a public servant acting under color of
office or employment is a class A misdemeanor punishable by a
term of imprisonment up to one year, a fine of up to $3,000, or
both.
(2) Sexual extortion by a person other than a public servant
acting under color of office or employment is a class B misde-
meanor punishable by a term of imprisonment up to 6 months,
a fine of up to $1,000, or both.
(3) A second conviction under this statute is punishable by a
term of imprisonment for a period not less than one nor more
than five years, a fine not less than $1,000 nor more than
$5,000, or both.
This statute draws heavily upon existing sexual harassment
laws. The type of request language ("suggests, solicits, requests,
commands, importunes, or otherwise attempts to induce") comes
from the Delaware sexual harassment criminal law.23 7 This lan-
guage is narrower than the Texas law ("subject") and broader than
the North Carolina law ("unsolicited overt requests or de-
mands"). 2 38 This language is appropriate to limit the crime of sex-
ual extortion to quid pro quo sexual harassment. The sexual
conduct requested is general-sexual contact. The Texas statute is
broader ("unwelcome sexual advances, requests for sexual favors, or
234. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 11, § 763; N.C. GEN. STAT. § 14-395.1.
235. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 11, § 763.
236. TEXAs PENAL CODE ANN. § 39.03.
237. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 11, § 763(2).
238. TExAS PENAL CODE ANN. § 39.03; N.C. GEN. STAT. § 14-395.1.
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other verbal or physical conduct of a sexual nature"),239 but again
encompasses more than quid pro quo sexual harassment.
The "threatening" language tracks the Model Penal Code ex-
tortion statute. 240 The threats are primarily taken from the laws
described in Part II.B., mirroring areas in which states have al-
ready regulated sexual harassment (and presumably found sexual
harassment to be a problem). Clause (5) comes from the Model Pe-
nal Code extortion statute.24 ' Clause (6) is a catch-all to encompass
behaviors not included in the previous clauses, such as the granting
of credit. The punishment for a public servant is the same as the
Texas statute.242 The punishment is graded because sexual extor-
tion by public officials involves not only the abuse of the victim, but
also the abuse of public office or employment. This statute provides
more severe punishment for repeat offenders.
This comprehensive law is designed to prohibit all forms of
quid pro quo sexual harassment. Some states may want to adopt a
narrower construction to address specific problems within their
state. Other states may want to adopt a broader statute that pro-
hibits the making of any threat in order to coerce sex. 2 43
Conclusion
Lawrence Friedman's history of criminal justice in America
documents the decriminalization of sexual and sex-related behavior
in the latter half of the twentieth century. 244 Some states removed
laws against any form of sexual behavior between consenting
adults, and other states relaxed their enforcement of laws against
sexual conduct such as fornication, adultery, and sodomy.245 The
Supreme Court ruled that forced sterilization violated the equal
protection clause,246 and that birth control247 and abortion 24 8 fell
under a constitutional right to privacy. The twentieth century saw
a shift from the Victorian view of sex as dangerous to a modem
239. TEXAS PENAL CODE ANN. § 39.03.
240. See supra note 191 and accompanying text.
241. Id.
242. TEXAS PENAL CODE ANN. § 39.02 (West Supp. 1994).
243. This situation may already be covered if the state has a statute against crim-
inal coercion, see supra note 198 and accompanying text, or terroristic threats, see
MPC, supra note 118, § 211.3 ("A person is guilty of a felony of the third degree if he
threatens to commit any crime of violence with purpose to terrorize another"). For
example, the statute may prohibit the situation where a man approaches a woman
in the street and says to her that he will beat her up unless she has sex with him.
244. FRIEDMAN, supra note 123, at 342-43.
245. Id. at 345-46.
246. Skinner v. Oklahoma, 316 U.S. 535 (1942)
247. Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965).
248. Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
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view of sex as healthy and the repression of sexual instincts as dan-
gerous.2 49 Interestingly, this sexual revolution occurred at the
same time that women were entering the workforce in greater num-
bers,250 with the result that men and women were increasingly en-
countering each other in nonsexual educational and professional
relationships-in the workplace and at coeducational schools. Re-
cent years have seen the increasing re-regulation of sex, but in a
new way. Whereas the deregulated sexual conduct primarily in-
volved consensual sex, the current regulation of sex mainly involves
coercive sex-related conduct that harms people. For example, mari-
tal rape, 2 5 1 stalking,252 and date rape2 53 have all been recently rec-
ognized as crimes. The criminalization of quid pro quo sexual
harassment falls logically within this developing trend.
Over the last two decades, sexual harassment victims in the
workplace and, more gradually, in schools and in other contexts
have begun to fight back in the courts. The development of civil
causes of action for sexual harassment under Titles VII and IX of
the Civil Rights Act of 1964 have aided women in gaining compen-
sation from the employers of their harassers for some of the harms
they have suffered. State laws have reached beyond federal civil
rights laws to provide not only compensation from employers, but
also protection against harassment in housing, by licensed profes-
sionals, by state actors, of the elderly and disabled, and through
tort causes of action. Delaware, North Carolina, and Texas have
criminal laws specifically prohibiting sexual harassment, and other
states have laws that may prohibit some sexually harassing con-
duct. However, quid pro quo sexual harassment is not covered by
most general criminal laws.
Quid pro quo sexual harassment should be treated as a crime
because it is a unique form of oppression rooted in the historical
249. See e.g., FRmDMAN, supra note 123, at 346.
250. See 1 LARSON & LARSON, supra note 4, § 3.10 (reporting that the proportion
of adult women in the United States working or seeking work rose from 25% in 1920,
to 34% in 1950, to 37% in 1960, to 43% in 1970, to 55% in 1985).
251. FRIMDMAN, supra note 123, at 433 (reporting that most states have aban-
doned in whole or in part a husband's immunity from prosecution for raping his
wife).
252. See Kelli L. Attinello, Comment, Anti-Stalking Legislation: A Comparison of
Traditional Remedies Available for Victims of Harassment Versus California Penal
Code Section 646.9, 24 PAC. L.J. 1945 (1993) (discussing stalking laws and arguing
that they are necessary because traditional remedies for victims of harassment do
not provide protection); Robert A. Guy Jr., The Nature and Constitutionality of
Stalking Laws, 46 VAND. L. REv. 991 (1993) (categorizing types of stalking laws and
assessing their constitutionality).
253. See John Dwight Ingram, Date Rape: It's Time for Wo" To Really Mean "No,"
21 AM. J. CraM. L. 3 (1993) (arguing for reform of rape laws to include date rape).
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subordination of women and it harms individual women, women as
a group, and society as a whole. In states with general criminal
laws that prohibit quid pro quo sexual harassment, prosecutors
should consider the value of pursuing sexual harassers under these
laws. All states, however, should consider adopting criminal laws
specifically prohibiting quid pro quo sexual harassment. The crime
of quid pro quo sexual harassment should be modeled after extor-
tion statutes that go beyond property law by punishing those who
make threats in order to extort any sexual act against the victim's
will. By criminalizing sexual extortion, states can take a more ac-
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